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3Abstract
This thesis provides a broad history of the Irish Press during the years 1919-1948. It 
sets forth how, from 1919 onwards, Republican leader Eamon de Valera became 
convinced of the need for a newspaper sympathetic to his aims, and how he went 
about raising funds for the enterprise both in Ireland and the United States. The 
corporate structure of the Irish Press is also examined, with particular emphasis on the 
role of the Controlling Director and the influence of the Irish Press American 
Corporation. The Irish Press was first published in 1931, and the thesis examines its 
support for Fianna Fail in the period under study. The work also examines the 
changes in the relationship between the party and the paper as Fianna Fail became 
more entrenched in government. The role of the first editor of the Irish Press. Frank 
Gallagher, is considered. The changes in the attitude of the Irish Press to Fianna Fail 
in the post-Gallagher period are also examined, with emphasis on the findings of the 
Fianna Fail sub-committee on publicity. The thesis concludes that the period under 
review was characterised by the emergence of four key elements in the culture of the 
Irish Press: volatile industrial relations climate, fund-raising problems, links to Fianna 
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4Introduction
The first issue of the Irish Press was published on September 5, 1931; its last issue 
appeared on May 25, 1995. During nearly 60 years of publication, it played a central 
role in Irish political and cultural life. The Irish Press sprang from a tradition of small, 
usually short-lived Republican journals stretching back to the end of the 19th century. 
These journals were collectively referred to as the “mosquito press” because, in the 
words of a journalist who worked on some of them, they were “small, difficult to kill 
and had a sting that was remembered”. (Gallagher 1927: 348). The early Republican 
journals were essentially political pamphlets rather than newspapers, but they 
provided a training ground for many journalists who were eventually to work for the 
Irish Press itself.
The need for a truly national newspaper which put forward a Republican viewpoint 
began to impress itself on Eamon de Valera in the early 1920s. During a visit to the 
United States in 1919, he has basked in favourable publicity, and had seen the 
influence positive coverage could have on public opinion. His American experience 
was in contrast to the coverage he and his fellow Republicans received in Ireland. In 
1922, he wrote: “The propaganda against us is overwhelming. We haven’t a single 
daily newspaper on our side, and only one or two small weeklies.” (Coogan 
1993:430). De Valera had been the subject of negative press coverage, firstly as a 
leader of Sinn Fein during the War of Independence, then as the leader of the anti- 
Treaty side during the Civil War, and then as leader of Fianna Fail after its foundation 
in 1926.
By 1927, de Valera had begun to raise funds for the foundation of a daily newspaper. 
He made two trips to the United States to put in place a fundraising operation there, 
and put a trusted lieutenant, Robert Brennan (later Ireland’s ambassador to the United 
States), in charge of fundraising in Ireland. Neither operation could be said to be an 
unqualified success, and both fell short of the targets set for them.
His decision in 1929 to ask subscribers to the Republican Loan -  a bond drive set up 
in the United States in 1919, designed to raise money to fund the War of 
Independence -  to invest their money in the planned newspaper had an important 
influence on the project. Firstly, it provided much-needed funding, but, because of the 
wording used in the documents by which investors handed over their money, it also 
gave de Valera personally a controlling stake in the new enterprise.
The Irish Press was formally incorporated in 1926, and its board included several of 
the country’s most prominent businessmen. The Irish Press American Corporation, 
which represented those American supporters who had reinvested the money they had 
subscribed to the Republican cause in 1919-1920, was incorporated in 1930. These 
subscribers signed over power of attorney to de Valera, giving him control of the 
American Corporation, which in turn controlled 47 per cent of the Irish Press 
company itself. De Valera’s control of the new paper was enhanced in the company’s 
Articles of Association, which appointed him to the post of Controlling Director. This 
role gave de Valera wide-ranging power over the editorial content of the newspaper, 
over the hiring and firing of staff. The power he had, firstly as majority shareholder 
thanks to the American Corporation, and secondly as Controlling Director, gave him
in an unassailable position, immune from internal board pressures or outside 
commercial influence.
The initial publicity material put forward by those involved in setting up the Irish 
Press claimed its editorial policy would be free party politics (NLI: 18361). But the 
paper’s influence on the fortunes of the Fianna Fail party was soon evident. The party 
won 57 seats in the second General Election of 1927, but that figure in creased to 72 
in the 1932 General Election, allowing Fianna Fail to form a government with the 
support of the Labour Party. Subsequently, in the General Election of 1933, Fianna 
Fail increased their representation to 77 seats, enough to form a government on their 
own. The 1932 election was the first in which de Valera’s party benefited directly 
from the support of the Irish Press, and the prosecution it the paper’s editor on charges 
of seditious libel just before polling day added to the sense that the new paper was an 
agent of change in the political system.
The relationship between the Irish Press and Fianna Fail during the period under study 
was a complicated one. Assuredly, the Irish Press supported Fianna Fail at election 
time and at other times of political crisis, and the party in turn displayed a proprietary 
attitude to the paper. This attitude became evident during the “McNeill affair”, a 
dispute between de Valera and Britain’s Governor General between April and July of 
1932 in which the Irish Press played a key role, at the direction of de Valera. After 
the resignation of editor Frank Gallagher, the relationship between party and paper 
became strained, as the new editor, William Sweetman, tried to move the Irish Press 
away from such a close association with the party. Under Gallagher, the Irish Press
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7“provided detailed political analysis”; under Sweetman, it “placed greater emphasis 
on description of people and events.” (Curran 1994: 280). These changes were not 
popular with Fianna Fail supporters, who expected their Cumann meetings to be 
reported and their party events to receive publicity. In March of 1940, Sweetman was 
called before the party’s sub-committee on publicity to explain himself.
Study of the Irish Press in the period 1919-1948 show four key characteristics of what 
de Valera called his “great enterprise” emerge. The relationship with the Fianna Fail 
party is, of course, of central importance. This thesis charts the relationship between 
the party and the paper, and shows the subtle changes it underwent in the period under 
review. In the early days, the Irish Press was a persuader for Fianna Fail, trying to 
persuade voters that de Valera and his colleagues were capable of government. In the 
later period, after many years of Fianna Fail rule, the Irish Pres became a defender of 
Fianna Fail, and towards the end of the period under study, even began to talk down 
to and lecture its readers.
Another key characteristic of the Irish Press (both the newspaper and the corporate 
entity) at the time was the failure of the twin fund-raising initiatives in Ireland and the 
United States. Despite the great energy and ingenuity expended on both, the capital 
targets set were never met, and even by the mid-1930s, the company was £40,000 
short of the £200,000 is set as the minimum necessary to fund the enterprise.
A third key element of the early history of the Irish Press was its corporate structure. 
The role of the Controlling Director gave de Valera immense power over the
8company, and his role as the representative of the shareholders of the Irish Press 
American Corporation strengthened his position even further.
The industrial relations culture at the Irish Press was also created at this time. From 
the very earliest days, the editorial side of the business was in dispute with the 
commercial side. The many letters of founding editor Frank Gallagher to the Board 
complaining of a lack of resources bear witness to a divergence between the two 
sides. As early as 1933, Gallagher wrote to the Board in defence of a wages clerk 
suspected of being involved in a strike. He spoke of “the Irish Press method: the half­
spoken innuendo that seems to blast more than any charge that can be met.” (NLI: 
19361). Gallagher had many battles with an American “efficiency expert” imposed by 
the management and the paper’s early years were beset by industrial disputes of one 
kind or another.
This work presents a broad history of the Irish Press in the period 1919-1948, and 
concentrates on these four areas which emerge as key themes: fundraising difficulties, 
corporate structure, links to Fianna Fáil, and industrial relations. It shows how the 
corporate structure of the company, put in place to ensure the Irish Press did not 
depart from the editorial path set by founder Eamon de Valera, led to many 
controversies and accusations of financial wrong-doing in the period under review, 
and sets out how the proprietorial attitude shown to the paper by Fianna Fáil officials 
let to strains between the party and the Irish Press towards the later 1930s and 1940s. 
The thesis examines the industrial relations climate in the Irish Press, which was beset 
by industrial unrest even before the first issue appeared on the streets, and also
9examines the fundraising operations in Ireland and the United States, showing how 
both fell short of the amount hoped for.
The period 1919-1948 was chosen because it was during this period that these four 
key elements of the paper’s history came into being. The period is also interesting 
because during these years, the Irish Press underwent several subtle but significant 
changes, from populist, pioneering organ to journal of the established political 
leadership. The period also includes those years in which de Valera became 
convinced that a sympathetic newspaper was necessary for Fianna Fail to enter 
government, and also covers those years in which the fundraising operations of both 
sides o f the Atlantic were set up. The year 1948 forms a natural break: it was in that 
year that Fianna Fail were finally ousted from power, and 1948 also saw the first issue 
of the Sunday Press, whose publication marked the real end of the Irish Press’s first, 
political phase, and heralded the beginning of a second, more commercial phase.
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Literature review
For a country with one of the highest newspaper readerships in Europe (O’Brien, 
2000, PI), there is a surprising dearth of critical literature on the Irish media. When it 
comes to literature on newspapers and their history, influence and political impact, the 
cupboard is especially bare. Most of the existing material, such as Hugh Oram’s The 
Newspaper Book (1983-) and PaperTigers_(1993) are history at a gallop, and are 
highly anecdotal and lacking in any critical analysis. Ivor Kenny’s book of interviews 
with newspaper editors, Talking to Ourselves (1994^ contains much analysis, but 
does not attempt to put the comments of the various interviewees in any historical 
context.
The attempts at history or memoir by journalists themselves are either highly 
subjective or lacking in any historical depth. Michael O’Toole’s More Kicks Than 
Pence (1992) is a colourful and energetically written account of life at the paper, but it 
is of necessity subjective. Mr Smvllie. Sir. Tony Gray’s 1991 biography of Irish 
Times editor Robert Smyllie, is a parade of anecdote. Frank Kilfeather’s account of 
his time at the Irish Press in Changing Times. A Life in Journalism (1997), is again 
highly subjective in its antagonism towards the paper’s management and the de 
Valera family.
More academic historians have approached the subject of the Irish Press obliquely, 
referring to it only insofar as it impacted on the lives of their subjects. Most
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biographers of de Valera mention merely that he founded the paper, or pause to 
defend him against charges of self-interest in its operation. An exception is Tim Pat 
Coogan’s 1993 biography of de Valera, Long Fellow. Long Shadow. Coogan dwells 
longer than any other biographer on de Valera’s relationship with the Irish Press. 
However, given Coogan’s own relationship with the paper (he was editor for almost 
20 years) and his relations with the de Valera family, it is understandably a subjective 
view. More recently, John Horgan’s biography of Sean Lemass, The Enigmatic 
Patriot (1997) also alludes to the Irish Press, and gives a good account of Lemass’s 
short but important sojourn as the company’s managing director.
Two studies -  Catherine Curran’s 1994 PhD thesis on the Irish Press and Populism in 
Ireland and Mark Anthony O ’Brien’s 2000 PhD thesis The Truth in the News? A 
Socio-Historical Analysis of the Relationship between Fianna Fail and the Irish Press 
-  provide by far the most valuable academic works on Irish print journalism. Curran’s 
work measures the content of the Irish Press during its early years against theories of 
populism to decide if  the paper could truly be said to be an exercise in populism. She 
provides a wide-ranging history of the Irish Press, concentrating mostly on the early 
period, when the Irish Press was at its most populist. Mark Anthony O’Brien’s work -  
subsequently published in book form as De Valera. Fianna Fail and the Irish Press 
(2001) -  charts the history of the Irish Press against the fortunes of the Fianna Fail 
party. He provides a comprehensive history of the paper and the party, and analyses 
the impact of modernity on both. Another important contribution to the literature on 
the Irish Press comes from Edward Cahill, who considers the collapse of the 
newspaper group from a financial point of view in Corporate Financial Crisis in 
Ireland (1997).
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This thesis differs from O’Brien's work in that it presents a broader history of the 
paper over a shorter period» going beyond its relationship with the Fianna Fail party. 
Also, this thesis examines closely the various fundraising and financial problems 
which beset the early management of the company. It concentrates on the raising of 
the Republican Loan and the influence of the Irish Press American Corporation. It 
differs from Curran’s work in that it is an historical survey rather than an exercise in 




The primary research for this thesis consisted of analysis of the content of the Irish 
Press from 1931 to 1948. The analysis concentrated on the content of the Irish Press at 
times when it was apt to make a statement regarding its stance on an important issue. 
Thus not only Irish Press editorials at election or by-election time were examined, but 
also those editorials -  and indeed general coverage -  relating to the League of 
Nations, the Anglo-Irish Treaty, the 1937 Constitution and the Economic War were 
examined. The primary research also looked at The Nation, seen by many as a 
precursor to the Irish Press, and its contemporary national newspapers, the Irish 
Independent and the Irish Times. The content of the Irish Press and the other national 
titles during the various court cases between the company and their partners Ingersoll 
Publications during the 1990s was also studied with a view to extracting material 
relating to the corporate structure of the company and the role of the Irish Press 
American Corporation dating back to the 1930s.
The archival research examined material relating to individuals involved in the 
establishment or operation of the newspaper. Frank Gallagher’s archive was 
especially helpful, as were those of Joseph Connolly, Joseph McGarrity and Erskine 
Childers. The archives of the Fianna Fail party, especially its publicity sub-committee, 
provided an insight into the proprietorial attitude of the party towards the paper.
The company records of the Irish Press company stored at the Companies Registration 
Office were instructive too in showing the extent to which various share offers were 
taken up. It was also helpful to see the register of subscribers, who came mostly from 
the labouring and lower middle classes. It is regrettable that the archives of the paper 
itself, now owned by Irish Press pic, were not made available.
However, it was in interviews with former Irish Press journalists that a more rounded 
picture of the Irish Press took shape. Michael Mills, former political correspondent, 
and Stephen O’Byrnes, also a political reporter on the paper, were forthcoming on the 
attitude of the paper towards the Fianna Fail party. Former Evening Press editor, 
Douglas Gageby (recently deceased) spoke warmly of the early, barnstorming days of 
the paper, and of his professional relationship with Major Vivion de Valera, who 
succeeded his father as Editor in Chief. Interviews with Michael O’Toole gave an 
insight into the curious fatalism that pervaded the Irish Press building at Burgh Quay. 
Michael O’Kane, former editor of the Sunday Press was also interviewed, as was 
Benedict Kiely, who spoke of the “circumambient” nature of Eamon de Valera’s 
influence on the paper during the 1940s.
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Chapter 1 -  Early origins of the Irish Press: 1919-1926
1.1 Introduction
A reader perusing the news stands in Dublin in 1919 would be faced with a wide array 
of newspapers, periodicals and magazines. Popular English newspapers like the Daily 
Mail, owned by the Irish-born Alfred Harms worth, later Lord Northcliffe, the Daily 
Express, owned by William Maxwell Aitken, later Lord Beaverbrook, Northcliffe's 
newest publication, the Daily Mirror, society gazettes like the Daily Sketch, and 
sensationalist magazines like Sir George Newnes’s Tit-Bits were all vying for the 
customer’s attention. Then, as now, Irish national newspapers had to fight against 
English papers for their place in the market. It is difficult to ascertain exact circulation 
figures for this period; the Audit Bureau of Circulation was not then in existence (it 
was founded in 1931), and other sources refer to 1930 and onwards. However, from 
these later figures, it is possible to get a picture of the newspaper market in Ireland of 
the 1920s. In a leaflet entitled Need for a National Daily Newspaper in Ireland 
circulated in the US from 1930 (NLI: 18361), we can establish that the Daily Mail’s 
circulation then stood at 70,000, with the Irish Times and the Cork Examiner each at 
around 30,000 each. From a later commentator (Browne 1937: 171) we know that the 
Irish Independent’s circulation was 143-152,000 in 1937. From these figures, it is 
possible to put together a picture of the daily newspaper market in the Ireland of the
1920s. It shows three main Irish national daily newspapers pitted against several 
larger English imports.
A Dublin reader determined to buy an Irish paper could have the Irish Times, the 
staid, conservative, organ of the Anglo-Irish class, or he could have the Irish 
Independent, the staid, conservative bible of the respectable Catholic middle class. If 
he bought the Independent, he would get news of the events of the day, the utterances 
of the Catholic Hierarchy, the doings of the Irish National Party MPs in Westminster 
and dispatches from various parts of the British Empire. If he bought the Irish Times. 
he would get much the same, except more about the Unionist MPs in Westminster and 
less about the Catholic bishops. But if  he wanted news of the Sinn Fein party that had 
formed itself into the first Dail Eireann on January 21, 1919, if  he wanted detailed 
reports of that Dail’s business, if he wanted to read the views of Eamon de Valera, 
who had been elected president of that Dail, or the views of other Republican leaders, 
his choice was even more restricted. If he held Republican views, he would find the 
pro-Unionist stance of the Trish Times repugnant. The Irish Independent, while it had 
deferred to the Catholic Hierarchy in banning certain books from its review pages 
(O’Donnell 1945: 386-394), was also repugnant to many readers of Republican views: 
firstly, it had championed the employers’ side in the 1913 lock-out (not surprisingly, 
as the Irish Independent’s proprietor, William Martin Murphy, was President of the 
Dublin Chamber of Commerce at the time, and led the employers’ side in the dispute), 
and secondly it had taken an anti-Republican line on the 1916 Rising.
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An example is the paper’s editorial dated April 26, 27, 28, 29, May 1, 2, 3, 4 (the 
extended publication date is presumably intended to cover the issues missed due to 
the Rising):
“No terms o f denunciation that pen could inscribe would be too strong to apply to those 
responsible for the insane and criminal rising last week ... When we come to think o f what the 
incendiaries have achieved, it is pitifully meagre ... The men who fermented the outbreak, and 
all who were responsible for the devastation around us, have to bear a heavy moral and legal 
responsibility from which they cannot hope to escape. They were out, not to free Ireland, but 
to help Germany . . .”
Joe Walsh, former editor of the Irish Press, recalled that it was thought at the time that 
such editorials had fermented anti-Republican feeling to such an extent that they “had 
a bearing on the execution of some of the leaders of the Rising” (IP: September 5, 
1981).
In this chapter, I propose to set the decision by de Valera to found the Irish Press 
company in the context of the Irish Press’s predecessors, the many Republican
thjournals which sprang up from the late 19 century to give voice to the nationalist 
view of Irish politics. I shall also examine why de Valera thought it politically 
necessary to have a mass-circulation newspaper sympathetic to the nationalist 
viewpoint, and how he set about raising money for the venture.
1.2 The early Republican Press
Between 1896 and 1903, several small publications sprang up, inspired by the ethos 
of the Gaelic League. Among these were An Claidheamh Soluis (March 1898- 
September 1919), The Leader (September 1900-December 1927), An Sean Van Vocht 
(January 1896-March 1899), the United Irishman (March 1989-April 1906) and the
18
Irish Peasant (February 1903-December 1910).
An Claidheamh Soluis was published by the Gaelic League itself and its first editor 
was Eoin MacNeill, founder of the Irish Volunteers. Influenced by Pâdraig Pearse and 
Piaras Béaslai, it campaigned to have Irish as a compulsory subject for matriculation 
to the National University of Ireland. The Leader’s editor D P Moran campaigned on 
many issues that were later to be taken up by the Irish Press: the need to foster 
indigenous Irish industry, the need to protect agriculture, and the need to break the 
railroad monopoly. The paper attacked aspects of Irish life that were later to be Irish 
Press targets too: the subservience of the Catholic middle classes to the British was a 
favourite.
The Leader was not, however, in favour of protectionism, on the grounds that it would 
mean higher prices for the Irish consumer. The United Irishman begged to differ. 
Edited by Arthur Griffith, it proposed to develop Irish industry and agriculture behind 
a tariff wall. It identified itself with the independence movement in India, as the Irish 
Press was to do later. When the United Irishman closed. Griffith set up a successor: 
the Sinn Féin Daily (April 1909-January 1910) which had as its goal the 
establishment of “a truly national press”.
From 1914 onwards, as the struggle for independence intensified, so the small scale 
publications which sprang up became more militant. The Irish Volunteer began 
publication in February, 1914. The official organ of the Irish Volunteers, the paper 
gave instructions on the use of rifles and had useful sections on how to demolish 
railway lines without explosives. (Curran 1996: 122).
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The beginning of the Great War was to have a twofold effect on Ireland’s papers: the 
Defence of the Realm Act 1914 meant that many of the more militant ones were 
suppressed, and the issue of Ireland’s stance in the conflict was to split the nationalist 
press down the middle, with, on the one side, the constitutional nationalist papers 
supporting the Irish Party and Home Rule, and, on the other, a growing number of 
separatist and labour papers. The more mainstream constitutional nationalist papers 
such as the Freeman’s Journal, and the National Volunteer, supported Irish enlistment 
in the British Army, but newer papers were vigorously against it. In March 1915, the 
British authorities in Ireland -  with the support of Irish party leader John Redmond -  
suppressed Griffith’s anti-recruitment paper Scissors and Paste (December 1914- 
February 1915). The irrepressible Griffith returned in June as editor of Nationality. 
published by the Irish Republican Brotherhood. The Easter Rising in 1916 and the 
threat of conscription in 1918 served to weaken the Irish Party cause and to increase 
support for the separatist cause. This support was evident with the huge vote for Sinn 
Fein in the 1918 elections. (Curran 1996: 123).
The Sinn Fein MPs formed themselves into the first Dail, which was promptly 
proscribed by the British, along with all journals supporting it. The Dail began then to 
publish its own paper, the Irish Bulletin. With assistance from Robert Brennan, 
Desmond Fitzgerald, Erskine Childers and Frank Gallagher -  many of whom were 
later to work on the Irish Press -  the Irish Bulletin became a daily publication with a 
circulation of about 2,000. Copies were sent to newspapers and governments all over 
the world, promoting the Irish cause and making propaganda against the British. For 
their part, the British tried valiantly to suppress it, but it always managed to move
offices just in time. At various stages it was printed in Robert Brennan’s house in 
Belgrave Square, Rathmines, the Farm Products Shop in Baggot Street, and 
“International Oil Importers”, Molesworth Street. The British authorities began 
printing a forged Bulletin with equipment they found during a raid on the Molesworth 
Street offices. The IRA moved quickly to stop this strategy, blowing up the British 
Army Auxiliary headquarters at the North Wall Hotel where the seized printing 
equipment was kept. (Curran 1996: 125)
1.3 De Valera and the raising of a Republican loan
As the Bulletin was being pursued by the British authorities, de Valera was in jail in 
Lincoln, his execution sentence having been commuted in deference to his American 
citizenship. He escaped and, after a brief visit home, decided to visit America to raise 
funds for the struggle for independence in Ireland. Accompanied by Dail colleague 
Harry Boland, he arrived in New York on June 11, 1919. This visit, which caused 
some surprise among his comrades in arms in Ireland, had, on the face of it, no 
connection with the much later decision to set up a nationalist newspaper in Ireland. 
But the funds raised to support the struggle against the British would come to have a 
central influence on the finances of the Irish Press.
Upon their arrival, de Valera and Boland immediately set about raising money for a 
national loan. In Dublin, the Dail had authorised the raising of a loan of $1,25m. De 
Valera and Boland persuaded the Friends of Irish Freedom (FOIF) to divert $250,000 
of their funds to Ireland and sought advice from prominent Irish-Americans on how 
best to exploit Irish-American sympathy for Sinn Fein in their fight against the
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British. Among those most closely associated with this fundraising drive were: Joseph 
McGarrity, leader of Clann na nGael in the US; Judge Daniel Cohalan, leader of the 
Clann in New York, and John Devoy of the influential Gaelic American newspaper. 
The suggestion was made that subscribers to a Republican Loan would be issued with 
bond certificates which they could exchange for real bonds once an Irish Republic 
was recognised. (Coogan 1993: 156).
De Valera’s advisors suggested a higher figure than that authorised by the Dail. “Ask 
for $1 Om and you’ll get $5m,” was McGarrity’s view (Coogan 1993: 158). De Valera 
sent to Ireland for businessman James O’Mara -  later appointed to the board of the 
Irish Press company -  to administer the fund. The following notice appeared in the 
American press: “ ... a 10,000,000 dollar bond certificate issue of the Republic of 
Ireland will be launched about January 15 on the general pattern of the American 
Liberty Loan and the Red Cross drives ... I want to emphasise the fact that this will 
be a sentimental appeal and not an appeal to investors ... it will be distinctly 
understood by each subscriber to the Loan that he is making a free gift of his money. 
Repayment of the amount is contingent wholly upon the recognition of the Irish 
Republic as an independent nation ... The certificate will be exchangeable at par for 
gold bond of the Republic at the treasury of the Republic, one month after the 
Republic has received international recognition and the British forces have been 
withdrawn from the territory of the Republic.” (Lavelle 1961: 150).
There was some demur at the idea of what amounted to an Irish insurgent raising 
funds in the US to carry on his insurgence in Ireland. Judge Cohalan was among those 
who thought the bond drive was illegal. The US State Department also had
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reservations, as one diplomat observed: “To close our eyes and do nothing to prevent 
our territory being used to further rebellion against a friendly nation is not very 
creditable to our government.” (Carroll 1978: 152-3). However, the drive went ahead 
and $5,123,640 was raised, most of it from “Irish domestic servants and others of like 
or lower intelligence”. (WSJ: February 4, 1920).
1.4 De Valera’s battle to keep loan funds
The disbursement of this money was to play a central role in the financing of the Irish 
Press. Ownership of and rights to the funds became the subject of a court case 
following the signing of the Treaty and the outbreak of civil war in Ireland. It is not 
possible to account for it all, but it is known that (i) de Valera left $3m on deposit in 
the US; (ii) that he had considerable expenses while staying in the US (one witness 
describes scenes of profligacy in de Valera’s suite in New York’s Waldorf Astoria 
hotel where refreshment was given to “stray Hibernians and the hungry priesthood” 
[Thwaites 1932: 191-2]), and (iii) £81,000 (nearly $500,000) was later paid over to 
the Provisional Government. (Coogan 1993: 391). That leaves perhaps $1.4m 
unaccounted for. It is likely that this money was sent immediately (i.e. in February, 
1919) back to Ireland to be used in the War of Independence.
De Valera made McGarrity and Irish trade consul Diarmuid Fawsitt trustees of the 
$3m left on deposit in New York. He joined Stephen O’Mara, who had replaced his 
brother James as de Valera’s chief fund-raiser in the United States (and was later to 
become a director of the Irish Press), and Dr Michael Fogarty, Bishop of Killaloe, as 
trustees of the money sent back to Ireland (or what was left of it after the War of
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Independence). In August 1922, the Provisional Government of Liam T Cosgrave 
began legal proceedings to recover the money raised in the Republican Loan.
In Ireland, de Valera and O’Mara objected, while Bishop Fogarty sided with the Free 
State Government. On July 31, 1924, Judge Mumaghan of the Dublin High Court 
found in the Provisional Government’s favour. De Valera’s side appealed, but the 
High Court’s decision was upheld by the Supreme Court on December 17, 1925. De 
Valera returned £81,000 to the Department of Finance.
In America, the Provisional Government secured an injunction which prevented those 
banks with which the Republican Loan funds were lodged from handing over the 
money, or any interest accumulated, to de Valera, O’Mara or anyone acting for them. 
They then (August 1922) applied to the US Supreme Court seeking a declaration that 
the Provisional Government was the legitimate successor to the Republican Dail and 
was thus entitled to the money subscribed to the establishment of the Irish Republic.
Meanwhile, de Valera was galvanising his allies in the US to oppose this action. Sean 
T O Ceallaigh, de Valera’s envoy in New York, wrote to John Hearn, chairman of the 
Bondholders’ Committee representing subscribers to the loan and an ally of de 
Valera’s, on August 25, 1925, urging the committee to “get to work with a view to 
intervening in the present case for the preservation of the Funds for the Republic”. 
(Coogan 1993: 391). The Bondholders’ Committee was represented at the US 
Supreme Court hearing of the case when it was eventually heard before Judge Peters 
in March 1927. The judge ruled that the money should go neither to de Valera nor to 
Cosgrave, but should be returned to the original investors.
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1.5 The Republican Press after the Treaty
After the split over the Treaty, the anti-Treaty side began publishing a journal called 
The Republic of Ireland (Phoblacht na hEireann) in January 1922. Prominent 
Republicans like Cathal Brugha, Austin Stack, Countess Markievicz and Erskine 
Childers contributed to the paper. The pro-Treaty provisional government responded 
with The Free State (first published in February 1922) which published articles by 
Ernest Blythe, Kevin O’Higgins, Eoin MacNeill and Desmond Fitzgerald. This was 
no simple circulation war, however: in June 1922, the provisional government enacted 
press controls aimed at suppressing the anti-Treaty journals. These obliged printers to 
submit any articles referring to the conflict for approval prior to publication. 
Subsequently, The Republic of Ireland was restricted to a southern edition published 
from Clonmel under the editorship of Erskine Childers and Frank Gallagher.
In 1924, Republican sympathisers tried to buy the defunct title to the Freeman’s 
Journal, but their efforts were thwarted by William Martin Murphy, owner of the Irish 
Independent, who stepped in and bought the title to merge it with that of his own 
paper. Further light was thrown on these events in a court case in the summer of 1932. 
In the course of the case, the court heard how the Independent company had bought 
the title and presses of the Freeman’s Journal for £24,000 in 1924. The court also 
heard evidence that there was speculation at the time that Independent Newspapers 
bought the paper and its presses to forestall an attempt by a group of Republicans to 
step in and use the Journal as the launching pad for the Republican paper that 
eventually became the Irish Press. The fact that Independent Newspapers chairman
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William Martin Murphy destroyed the presses of the Journal and merely incorporated 
the title into that of the Irish Independent lent credence to this theory. (EP: June 30, 
1932).
1.6 Conclusion
As is evident from the number and endurance of so many nationalist publications, 
generations of nationalists have been aware of the need to put their point of view 
across in the public prints. When de Valera made the decision to take action to found 
the Irish Press is not certain, but the attitude of the mainly pro-British press in Ireland 
had been occupying his mind from the early 1920s on, as an onslaught of negative 
publicity took its toll, first on Sinn Fein in the war of independence, then on the anti- 
Treaty side in the Civil War, and lastly on Fianna Fail.
During his visit to the US in 1919, de Valera had basked in favourable publicity from 
the American Press; he had seen the influence positive coverage could have on public 
opinion. As early as 1922, de Valera wrote to John Hearn, treasurer of the American 
Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic (AARIR), a body set up by de 
Valera during his visit to the US in 1919-1920: “The propaganda against us is 
overwhelming. We haven’t a single Daily newspaper on our side, and only one or two 
small weeklies.” (Coogan 1993:430). This attitude is echoed by Sean Lemass in a 
newspaper article in which he blamed the poor showing of Fianna Fail in the local 
elections of 1925 on the “hostility of the Press linked to the hostility o f the Church”. 
(II: March 14, 1925).
In an impassioned letter to de Valera, Frank Gallagher, who would later become 
editor of the weekly paper The Nation and then of the Irish Press, describes the harm 
done to Fianna Fail by the refusal of the existing national newspapers to report its 
affairs. “If we could break down the conspiracy of silence in the Daily Press, it would 
be worth 10 times what we’re doing in handbills.” (NLI: 183642).
The attitude of the Catholic Church may also have had an influence on de Valera’s 
decision to start a newspaper of his own. Throughout the 1920s, various Catholic 
societies had been objecting to the unhindered access to the Irish reading public 
allowed to the British press. The Catholic Truth Society and several “vigilance 
societies” were concerned that the content or British newspapers and periodicals, 
especially that content which referred to birth control and other issues of sexual 
morality, were having an injurious effect on Irish morality. This campaigning by the 
Catholic right may have had little influence on de Valera, but at the very least the 
existence of such campaigns show that de Valera’s call for an Irish, nationalist 
newspaper which would counter the “morally objectionable” (NLI: 18632) English 





The Irish Press 1926-1931
2.1 Introduction
The Fianna Fail party was founded in 1926. They contested and lost two General 
Elections in 1927, winning 44 seats in the first and 57 in the second. Unless there was 
a political or constitutional crisis, there would not be another election until 1932. All 
the party’s efforts were aimed at increasing their representation in the 1932 poll. And 
for de Valera, the Irish Press was a key component in that electoral strategy. He was 
keenly aware of the impact a lack of publicity for Fianna Fail policies was having, 
writing to his close ally in the US Joseph McGarrity in 1927 that: “The newspapers 
here make it almost impossible to make any progress. We must get an Irish national 
newspaper before we can hope to win.” (McGarrity: MS 17441).
Even after Fianna Fail entered the Dail in 1927, de Valera felt strongly that the press 
of the day did not treat him fairly. His official biographer amplifies this feeling of 
resentment: “Although Leinster House gave him one sounding board, the press did 
not satisfy him in its treatment of the ideas he expressed as his experience of 
parliamentary opposition increased. There seemed to him to be full coverage for the
Government’s achievements, like the engineering scheme to dam up the Shannon 
river for electric power; like the decision of the League of Nations to register the 1921 
treaty against British protests; like the participation in imperial conferences out of 
which came a declaration of autonomy for the dominions.” (Bromage 1956: 259) 
Another biographer echoes this: “The daily Press was unanimously opposed to Fianna 
Fail, so Dev felt seriously handicapped in his efforts to get his party’s policies across 
to the electorate.” (Dwyer 1991: 153).
From the outset, Fianna Fail’s main policy was economic self-sufficiency, and in 
order to further that policy, the support of a number of constituencies of Irish society 
was necessary: Irish manufacturers, smaller farmers and the urban working class 
would all have to be enlisted if the dream of an Ireland economically independent 
from Britain could be realised. As time went on, de Valera became ever more keenly 
aware of “the hostility of the existing daily papers towards Fianna Fail”. (Manning 
1972: 42). Another commentator points out that the Irish Press “was founded in 
response to an immediate and pressing need for a mass circulation daily to assist in 
Fianna Fail’s struggle for hegemony against the ruling party, Cumann na nGaedhael”. 
(Curran 1996: 7). But that struggle would continue without a proper mouthpiece until 
1931, while fundraising and general organisation took place. The fiery weekly paper 
The Nation did its best to counter the anti-de Valera and anti-Fianna Fail stance of the 
mainstream press. The years between the foundation of the Irish Press company in 
1928 and the appearance of the newspaper on the streets in 1931 were a time of 
consolidation and planning, but most of all of fundraising.
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2.2 The early fight for funds
Prior to the first publication of the Irish Press in 1931, de Valera made three trips to 
the US. The first, from June 11, 1919, to December 10, 1920, was concerned with the 
raising of the Republican Loan. The second trip, from March to May 1927, and the 
third, in December 1927, were more or less directly concerned with raising money for 
the Irish Press. The March trip coincided with the hearing of the Republican Bonds 
case before Judge Peters, while his third, in December of the same year, was 
concerned wholly with securing funds for the foundation of the Irish Press. As we 
have seen, de Valera was in no need of further persuasion of the need for a 
sympathetic daily newspaper, but one commentator suggests that he was spurred into 
immediate action by a speech by Cumann na nGaedheal leader Ernest Blythe. “He 
had been persuaded to take this second trip [in 1927] by a statement of Ernest 
Blythe’s to the effect that the Free State Government was happy to be a member of 
the British Commonwealth. De Valera vehemently replied: ‘If we had a daily paper at 
this moment I believe that Blythe’s statement could be used to waken up the nation, 
but the daily press that we have slurs it over and pretends that nothing vital has been 
said. The English Press, of course, are boasting it whenever they can. This is natural 
enough for it is Britain’s final victory over what remained of the Collins mentality and 
policy.” (Reynolds: Magill. August 1978).
De Valera was accompanied on the December trip by Frank Gallagher. On his arrival, 
de Valera issued a statement (December 28, 1927) to the press that the purpose of his 
visit “was concerned with the establishment of an Irish Daily newspaper” for which
the total capital needed would be £200,000, of which £100,000 ($500,000) was to be 
raised in the US. (Coogan 1993: 415). On the same date, he wrote to McGarrity that 
he wanted to contact at least one thousand people who would subscribe $500 each to 
the enterprise, adding that, “as the proposition is purely a business one, it should not 
be difficult to find them”. (NLI: 17441).
The fundraising got off to a promising start. Gallagher describes an event in New 
York’s Waldorf Astoria at which 24 people each subscribed $500. (TCD: 165/200). 
But McGarrity was not optimistic. In January 1928, he wrote to de Valera that under 
the present depressed business conditions, it was better to approach “men of means” 
like Randolph Hearst for subscriptions. (NLI: 17441). As the year progressed, things 
did not improve. De Valera reduced the subscription limit from $500 to $50 (SFL: 
May 12, 1928). In September, a gloomy McGarrity wrote: “Things in a business way 
are bad in this country at present. Many of those who would give are not making 
[money] and avoid gatherings where subscriptions are likely to be asked.” (NLI: 
17441).
Even on the west coast of America, where de Valera remained popular (as one 
commentator notes, his popularity in the rest of the US fell after the Civil War; most 
subscribers to the Dail Loan went on to support the Free State side in the Civil War 
and to support Cosgrave’s government. [Sarbaugh 1985: 1522]), funds were slow in 
coming, despite de Valera playing up the importance of America in Irish affairs: “We 
want Ireland to look west to America, rather than look east to England. We want an 
Irish paper that will be as Irish as the Daily Mail is English.” (SFL: January 28, 1928)
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Despite the arrival of Frank Aiken in October 1928, who set up a network of 
fundraising committees along the west coast, the money de Valera hoped for was not 
forthcoming. De Valera’s frustration is evident from a letter to a fundraiser on 
September 29, 1929: “Up to the present, of the American quota of $500,000 only 
$135,000 has been subscribed ... The United States has so far been a sore 
disappointment.” (Fianna Fail: FF26). Another author notes: “It was quickly realised 
that the response in business circles was poor. The onset of the Depression severely 
restricted the availability of capital for investment in a venture such as the Irish Press. 
(Curran 1996: 10).
The Irish side of the fundrai sing operation -  under the direction of Robert Brennan, 
formerly director of publicity for Sinn Fein -  was initially well received. “The Board 
is certainly impressive, and seems to support the statement that the project is not too 
rigidly of one party. With the exception of Mr de Valera, who incidentally has 
considerable organising ability, all the directors are businessmen, and two are 
managing directors of successful companies. With a good management, the project 
has every prospect of success. There is ample scope for three Daily papers and the 
project ought to be generally welcome,” wrote the Irish correspondent of the Sunday 
Times. (ST: March 27, 1927). The first advertisements announcing the new paper 
appeared in the Wicklow People on December 31, 1927. The provincial press was 
used to publicise the paper because the national papers refused to accept the 
advertisements. (Curran 1996: 9).
The growing network of Fianna Fail party branches was also used to raise funds. “The 
[fundraising] campaign in Ireland provided an early example of the organisational
proficiency of the local Fianna Fail cumainn. The 1928 Ard Fheis passed a resolution 
which called on all local party branches to become involved in the project. Each 
branch was assigned to canvass its local area for subscriptions, while a key party 
member was put in charge of fundraising in each constituency or district. While 
canvasses sought out individuals who could subscribe for blocks of 100 shares or 
more, it seems that the majority of £1 shares were sold on an instalment basis.” 
(Curran 1994: 142).
However, the Irish side of the fundraising operation soon encountered difficulties too. 
As one commentator has pointed out, “the paper appeared on the streets of Dublin just 
as the Great Depression was having its most devastating effect on international trade 
...” (Curran 1994: 160). Its debut also coincided with the abandonment by the United 
Kingdom of the Gold Standard and considerable disarray at the League of Nations. 
Following the formal incorporation of the Irish Press in September 1928, further 
advertisements were placed in the provincial press appealing for investors. The 
advertisements offered 200,000 ordinary shares at £1 each, half of which were to be 
sold in Ireland. (NLI: 18361).
2.3 The Nation -  holding the fort
As the fundraising continued, the need for a mouthpiece for the Fianna Fail party was 
met to some extent by the re-launch of the weekly newspaper, The Nation. In March 
1927, Sean T O Ceallaigh, a close associate of de Valera’s, decided to rejuvenate this 
staid old journal. Edited by Frank Gallagher, The Nation had a fresh, populist appeal 
and was aimed at the working classes and the rural poor. Its circulation never reached
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the heights required by the party: it peaked at 6,000 (Walsh: IP September 5, 1981). 
Although The Nation had been published in various forms since 1842, the relaunched 
version of March 26, 1927 was more dynamic and populist than any of its other 
incarnations. In its editorial, “Where We Stand”, it proclaimed: “The Nation stands 
for an Irish Republic ... for the freedoms for which the men and women of 1916 
fought and died . . .” In its early issues, it makes great play of the welcome the new 
Fianna Fail leader Eamon de Valera was receiving on his tour of the US. Its issue of 
April 30,1927, is given over to a collage of American Press clippings covering de 
Valera’s progress.
The Nation did its best to win over support for the party. It made a strong bid to win 
the support of the working classes and the poor. In its first issue, the paper argued that 
Ireland was in the grip of the worst economic depression since the famine, and laid 
the blame at the door of the “imperialist” Cumann na nGaedheal government. Despite 
the railings of Frank Gallagher, who developed on The Nation the populist style that 
would later characterise the Irish Press. The Nation did not achieve enough popularity 
to be of use to Fianna Fail.
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2.4 Making a start: foundation of the Irish Press
When the Irish Press was incorporated in September 1928, the founding directors 
invested £500 each, with the exception of James Lyle Stirling, who invested £1,000. 
Later, Senator James Connolly, who replaced Stirling, invested £500. The founding 
directors were:
Eamon de Valera, Controlling Director, 84 Serpentine Avenue, Co Dublin; Teacher, 
Chancellor, National University of Ireland.
James Charles Dowdall, Villa Nova, College Road, Cork; Merchant, Senator, 
Director, Dowdall, O’Mahony & Co. Ltd.
Henry Thomas Gallagher, Tallaght, Co. Dublin; Merchant, Chairman and Managing 
Director, Umey Chocolates, Limited.
John Hughes, Laragh, Killiney, Co Dublin; Merchant, of John Hughes & Co., Dublin 
Philip Busteed Pierce, Park House, Wexford; Merchant, Managing Director, Philip 
Pierce and Co., Limited, Mill Road Iron Works
Stephen O’Mara, Strand House, Limerick; Merchant, Chairman and Managing 
Director, O’Mara & Co., Limited.
James Lyle Stirling, Granite Lodge, Dun Laoghaire; Merchant, Chairman and 
Managing Director, Stirling, Cockle and Ashley, Limited.
Edmund Williams, Coreen, Ailesbury Road, Co Dublin; Maltster, of D. E. Williams, 
Limited, Tullamore.
(Source: Irish Companies Registration Office).
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As one writer has pointed out, the board “consisted of prominent Irish industrialists 
and businessmen who had an interest in promoting the cause of native Irish 
industry...” (Curran 1996: 13).
2.5 Role of the Controlling Director
However, de Valera was by far the most powerful member of the board. The extent of 
his influence is spelled out in the articles of association of the Irish Press. Article 75 
states:
“The first Controlling Director shall be Eamon de Valera who is hereby appointed such 
controlling director and who shall hold in his own name shares o f the Company o f the 
nominal value o f Five Hundred Pounds. He shall continue to hold the said office of 
Controlling Director so long as he shall hold the said sum o f Five Hundred Pounds nominal 
value o f  the Shares or Stock o f  the Company. The remuneration o f  the said Eamon de Valera 
as such Controlling Director shall be determined by the Shareholders in General Meeting.”
Article 77 further spells out the powers of the Controlling Director, which one 
biographer described as the “profane equivalent of the three divine persons in one 
God” (Coogan 1993: 420):
“The Controlling Director shall have sole and absolute control o f the public and political 
policy o f  the Company and o f the Editorial Management thereof and o f  all Newspapers, 
pamphlets or other writings which may be from time to time owned, published, circulated or 
printed by the said Company. He may appoint and at his discretion remove or suspend all 
Editors, Sub-editors, Reporters, Writers, Contributors of news and information, and all such 
other persons as may be employed in or connected with the Editorial Department and may 
determine their duties and fix their salaries or emoluments. Subject to the powers o f the 
Controlling Director the Directors may appoint and at their discretion remove or suspend 
Managers, Editors, Sub-editors, Reporters, Secretaries, Solicitors, Cashiers, Officers, 
Publishers, Printers, Contributors o f news and information, Clerks, Agents and Servants for 
permanent, temporary or special services as they may from time to time think fit and may 
determine their duties and fix their salaries and emoluments in such instances and to such 
amounts as they think fit.”
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These articles gave de Valera control over the Irish Press for as long as he lived and 
ensured that no board of any political or commercial hue could countermand his 
instructions regarding the editorial content or commercial behaviour of the Irish Press.
Quite apart from the power vested in him as Controlling Director, the role of de 
Valera was central to the early fortunes of the Irish Press. In its publicity material, the 
founders of the Irish Press declared that “the new Daily will not be a propagandist 
sheet or a mere party organ”. (NLI: 18361). In practically the same breath, they 
announced that the editorial policy of the paper would be under the sole direction of 
Mr de Valera. His political activities came second in importance to his Irish Press 
duties in the pre-publication days of 1930 and 1931. A note from the time refers to 
his “late nights at the IP” (Coogan 1993: 429), while another biographer notes: “ ... 
while he was overseeing preparation for the first edition of the Irish Press, he 
delegated most of the Fianna Fáil work to others; but with the paper, he saw to 
everything ...” (Longford & O’Neill 1970: 274). Indeed, such was his commitment to 
the founding of the paper that he told the 1931 Fianna Fáil Ard Fheis that party work 
could go on without him but the work of the Irish Press was of supreme importance at 
that time. (Curran 1994: 142).
2.6 De Valera the persuader: the battle for hearts and cash
Throughout this period, de Valera used a dual appeal to investors. The first was a 
sentimental appeal based on the argument that the Irish Press would be a counter­
balance to the British worldview put forward by the existing Irish press and by the 
large number of British newspapers circulating in the Irish market. The second could
be called an appeal to the head, based on the argument that newspaper publishing was 
a profitable business, and that a nationalist newspaper was, given the electoral support 
for Fianna Fail, guaranteed a substantial circulation.
The need for a national newspaper to counter this tide of pro-British propaganda was 
a major theme in de Valera’s speeches and writings during his visits to the US in 
1927. On his arrival in New York in December 1927, he told a Press conference: 
“There is nothing so important for Ireland as a newspaper that will champion her 
freedom.” (Dwyer 1991: 163). In other promotional material circulated in the US 
from 1930, de Valera and Gallagher played on anti-British sentiments: “The existing 
Daily Press is consistently pro-British and imperialistic in its outlook. In foreign 
affairs it invariably supports British policy and strives to arouse hostility against all 
possible rivals of Great Britain, not excepting the United States. During the European 
War, it was the main vehicle for lying British propaganda and was the sole agency in 
luring young Irishmen into a war in which 50,000 of them lost their lives.” (NLI: 
18361).
In support of his attack on the pernicious influence of the pro-British Press, de Valera 
quoted the Irish Jesuit polemicist and writer Father R S Devane SJ, who ventured that 
“A glance at the counter of any newspaper shop ... will convince even the most 
sceptical that we are in a condition of mental bondage.” A new Irish paper would stem 
the tide of “objectionable” English newspapers, but might also provide a solution to 
“perhaps the most serious aspect of the problem ... that presented by juvenile literature 
... [which served to] turn the minds of Irish girls and boys definitely away from Irish 
ideals, to make them despise Irish culture and the Irish national tradition. Many of the
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boys' papers are in effect recruiting agencies for the British Boy Scouts, which in turn 
are a recruiting agency for the British Army and Navy.” (Devane 1930: 55-69).
As Catherine Curran points out, “the campaign against the British Press dovetailed 
neatly with Fianna Fail’s populist campaign against dumping and monopoly 
domination of the Irish market”. (Curran 1994: 113). The reluctance of Cumann na 
nGaedhael to impose tariffs on British newspapers and magazines was criticised by 
Fianna Fail. The issue helped to win them the support of some of the Catholic 
intelligentsia. In 1926, the Free State’s Minister for Justice established a Committee 
of Enquiry on Evil Literature to prepare submissions in preparation for Censorship of 
Publications Act.
De Valera’s stance against British publications had several strands: the economic 
argument that “dumping” on the Irish market was wrong, which fitted in well with 
Fianna Fail’s policy of protection for Irish industries; the ideological argument that 
the high circulation of these newspapers tended to corrupt Ireland’s youth and turn 
them against their own country, and lastly the (unspoken) commercial argument that 
if the UK papers were allowed to “dump” on the Irish market, then the battle of the 
Irish papers to win circulation would be all the harder. And this last argument was by 
no means a frivolous one, even taking into account the vast differences in appeal 
between the Irish papers and their British competitors. As we have seen, the Daily 
Mail had a large daily circulation (between 70,000 and 100,000), and the following 
table presented to the Government’s Commission on Evil Literature by the Catholic 
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The difficulty in which de Valera found himself when raising funds for the new 
enterprise is interesting. On the one hand, he had to appeal to business investors, who 
would not invest in the paper unless they could see it was founded on sound 
commercial principles. They would not subscribe their money to radicals writing 
intemperate leading articles. On the other hand, he had to win over the small investor 
and Fianna Fail supporter, who was disenchanted with the status quo and wanted to 
read material that reflected his nationalist views. Thus de Valera writes to possible 
Irish-American investors in San Francisco in the San Francisco Leader of April 19, 
1930: “The only reason in fact why I am engaged in this enterprise is to provide the 
Irish with a paper which will give them the truth in the news, without attempting to 
colour it for party purposes; also to supply the leadership for the necessary economic, 
political and social reconstruction in Ireland today.”
Likewise, Gallagher's publicity material for business consumption gave assurances 
that “guarantees of considerable financial support in Irish business circles were 
already forthcoming”, while other handbills told how the Republican electorate had 
been forced for too long to subscribe to a pro-imperialist press and that it would turn 
immediately to a paper which expressed its true national point of view. (NLI: 18631).
The absence of a newspaper that would truly reflect nationalist Ireland was a 
prominent argument used in the circular to prospective investors in Ireland. A leaflet 
drafted by Gallagher proclaimed: “It is proposed to establish in Ireland a Daily 
newspaper that will be truly Irish in purpose and character, will accurately reflect the 
tradition and sentiments of the Irish people and will inspire and assist them in the 
work of national regeneration and development.” On a more commercial note, 
investors were asked to note that the Irish Times and the Cork Examiner both had 
circulations considerably less than 50,000 “yet both yield their shareholders 
handsome dividends”. (NLI: 18632).
Developing the theme of a small nation struggling to assert its separateness amid a sea 
of smutty newsprint from its degenerate neighbour, the leaflet noted that there were 
18 UK dailies on sale in the Free State, and that “the Daily Mail has a circulation 
between 70,000 and 100,000 per day”. Later the tone becomes more censorious: 
“Seven of the morally objectionable English Sunday papers alone have a circulation 
of 352,803.” The leaflet proposes that this situated be remedied by the publication of 
what it quotes Mr de Valera describing as “A paper that will be as Irish as the London 
Times is English.” In a margin note on the circular, Frank Gallagher, wrote: “The 
greatest political need in Ireland today is to restore the confidence of the Irish people
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in themselves and their economic future. The new daily paper will have that as one of 
its main objectives. It will not only preach this self-confidence, however. It will itself 
be an example of it. Granted that sufficient capital can be raised, the people would see 
Irish brain and Irish enterprise creating a great national institution which would more 
than pay its way.”
The financial argument was put succinctly in a letter from de Valera which formed 
part of his US fundraising drive. “At the Free State general election of 1927, 411,000 
first preference votes were given to Fianna Fail candidates ... they are all potential 
readers of the new paper ... Accounts recently published for the Irish Independent 
show that a daily newspaper may be made a valuable property. The annual profits of 
the ‘Independent’ are sufficient to pay a 7 1/2 % fixed dividend on the preference 
share capital of £200,000 ... Hence, once the proposed newspaper is established, a 
continued flourishing existence is assured to it.” (FF: 1930)1
Despite these dual appeals, and despite all the effort expended on both sides of the 
Atlantic, the fundraising operation was not an unqualified success. At a meeting of 
shareholders in the Rotunda on February 19, 1929, company secretary Robert 
Brennan presented a report which showed that 124,679 of the 200,000 shares had 
been allotted. This seems a respectable figure, but the more important figure is the 
number of those shares which were “subscribed” (i.e. paid for). This figure stood at 
£64,864 and 10 shillings. (NLI: 18361). A prospectus filed with the 1928 returns of 
the Irish Press outlines how the process of allotment and subscription operated. A 
buyer paid two shillings per share on application, then another five shillings on
1 Not contained in the Fianna Fail archive, but part o f a set o f documents relating to the Irish Press 
framed in the party’s offices. The letters and other documents displayed are dated 1930.
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allotment, then another five shillings two months after allotment, four shillings four 
months later, and another four shillings three months later and so on. (Irish 
Companies Registration Office).
2.7 The role of the Irish Press American Corporation
It seems that it was around this time (mid to late 1929) that a strategy which was to 
have a central effect on the fortunes of the Irish Press began to be employed. De 
Valera decided to appeal to the original subscribers to the Republican Loan -  due to 
get their money back following the US Supreme Court judgement -  to sign that 
money over to him for investment in the Irish Press.
In September 1929, he wrote to his American allies: “A large percentage of those who 
subscribed to the Republican Loan of 1919-1920 will be prepared to reinvest the 
money.. .if only they are properly approached ... I ask you to form canvassing 
committees and personally call on those who are about to receive back the Bond 
money from the Receiver and urge them to resubscribe the money.” (Fianna Fail: 
FF26).
De Valera also appealed directly to the Republican Loan subscribers. His letter was 
accompanied by one from Frank P Walsh, Irish Press secretary in the US, dated 
January 30, 1930:
“Dear friend,
The money which you gave in the years 1919 to 1921 to help the cause of Ireland is 
about to be given back to you. You are probably one of those who gave your money 
at that time as a free gift, expecting no other return for it than the satisfaction of 
participating in a just cause and aiding the people of Ireland in a time of need. 1 feel
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accordingly that when you read this leaflet you will be disposed to make this money 
available a second time - again in a good cause and for the benefit of Ireland.”
The circular continues: “... many ... like yourself... have informed Mr de Valera that 
on receipt of their checks they will immediately endorse them and turn them into his 
account, so as to be available for the establishment of the needed Irish newspaper.
But it was not necessary, Walsh continued, “to wait for the actual distribution to take 
place ... This work can be proceeded with now, provided that the directors of Irish 
Press Limited have the assurance, by the legal assignment of a sufficient number of 
bond certificates to Mr de Valera, that the balance of the sum they require will 
become available when the Republican Loans are repaid.”
This legal assignment was enclosed with the circular; it read:
“In consideration of one dollar, lawful money of the United States of America ... I 
hereby sell, assign, transfer and set over unto EAMON DE VALERA, his executors, 
administrators, rights and assigns, all my right, title and interest in and to Bond 
Certificate No ... in the sum of $... of the Republic of Ireland Loan and all sums of 
money, both principal and interest, now due on, or hereafter to become due on, or 
because of the obligation set forth and/or referred to in said Bond Certificate; and I do 
hereby constitute said EAMON DE VALERA my attorney, in my name and 
otherwise, but at his own cost, to take all legal measures which may be proper and 
necessary for the complete recovery on and enjoyment of the assigned Bond 
Certificate.”
(Fianna Fail: FF26).
The Irish Press Corporation was incorporated in the State of Delaware on May 19, 
1930. This is generally agreed to be the corporate body which represented the US side 
of the Irish Press operation. Those subscribers who made their shares over to de 
Valera effectively bought shares in the Irish Press Corporation, which in turn took a 
stakeholding in the Irish Press parent company in Ireland. The operation and 
ownership of the Irish Press Corporation has been shrouded in secrecy for over 70 
years, and it is difficult to get a definitive account of its role in the Irish Press as a
whole. The first return lodged with the State of Delaware was filed on January 5,
1932, four months after the first issue of the Irish Press was published. It shows the 
total number of taxable shares at 100,000, but the “number of shares actually issued” 
is 46,049. This does not tally with de Valera’s figure of $135,000 from a hoped-for 
total of $500,000 and simply adds to the confusion around the status and role of the 
Irish Press Corporation. However, it is safe to conclude that the fundraising operation 
in the United States fell short of the total set for it.
The first return lists the business of the company as “issuing and transferring stock 
certificates”. There are 100,000 ordinary shares in the company, 61,497 of them 
issued. But by 1996, there is a remarkable difference. The share return shows that 
there are now 99,800 “class A” shares and 200 “class B” shares. In the earlier returns, 
there is no mention of preferred shares, or indeed any type of share other than 
“ordinary”.
The difference in importance of these A and B shares in the Irish Press Corporation is 
explained by evidence given by de Valera’s grandson during a later High Court action 
over the ownership of the Irish Press titles. “During evidence, Eamon de Valera 
revealed that he had acquired 100, or half the voting B shares in the American 
Company Irish Press Corporation from his uncle Terry de Valera in 1985 for 
£250,000. He owns all the voting shares which in turn control a 47pc stake in IP 
PLC.” (B&F: July 23, 1993).
All accounts of the role of the “arcane” (Coogan 1993: 420) operation in Delaware 
agree on several points:
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(i) That the Irish Press American Corporation controlled around 47% of the 
Irish Press company;
(ii) That the Irish Press American Corporation was comprised of non-voting A 
shares and 200 B shares which carried all the voting rights;
(iii) That de Valera set up a trust to administer these voting B shares. As we 
saw, those subscribers who signed over their Bond money to him also 
appointed him as their trustee, so he, and his successors, had control over the 
voting rights of the Irish Press American Corporation, and therefore its 47% 
stake in the Irish Press;
(iv) That this control, together with his own shareholding, gave him effective 
control of the Irish Press.
(O’Toole 1992: 58-59; Cahill 1997: 280; Coogan 1993: 420-421; B&F: June 11, 
1992).
There is some confusion as to the fate of the B shares after de Valera divested himself 
of control of the Irish Press upon being elected president of the Irish Republic in 
1959. According to former Irish Press board member Elio Malocco, the 200 B shares 
were originally split between de Valera and his son-in-law Sean Nunan, and de 
Valera’s shares were transferred to his son Vivion in 1959, while Nunan’s went to 
Vivion’s brother Terry. Terry was given to understand that Vivion’s shares would go 
to him, but on Vivion’s death found out that Vivion had transferred his shares to his 
(Vivion’s) own son, Eamon de Valera. (This account appeared in the first, last and
46
only issue of Patrick magazine, published by Malocco, dated December/January 
1998/1999 pp 22-27 and suppressed by injunction; it was never distributed).
There is also confusion caused by advertisements which appeared in Irish American 
papers in May 1993, offering $10 a share for shares in the Irish Press Corporation. (II: 
May 13, 1993). Other reports tell of Eamon de Valera (jnr) buying up shares from the 
Carmelite religious order in New York. (B&F: June 11, 1992). It seems likely to this 
writer that Eamon de Valera (jnr) -  who at the time of writing is still chairman of Irish 
Press pic -  inherited half the voting rights from the Irish Press American Corporation 
through his father Vivion. It also seems clear, from his own evidence to the High 
Court, that he bought the rest from his uncle Terry de Valera in 1985. The issue of 
advertisements in the US papers offering to buy other shares is needlessly confusing: 
the advertisements do not make it clear if A or B shares were sought. We can be 
reasonably sure that first Eamon de Valera, then his son Vivion, and then his grandson 
Eamon, firstly through their roles as controlling director, and secondly through their 
control of the American shares, exerted an unusually tight control of the destiny of the 
Irish Press. It is hard to disagree with the verdict of former Irish Press editor Tim Pat 
Coogan: “All that is required to be said about this trust since its foundation is that it 
did what it was set up to do. It held the Irish Press for de Valera, and later his son and 
grandson, against all comers.” (Coogan 1993: 421).
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2.8 De Valera’s shareholding in the Irish Press
There is further confusion about the exact nature of de Valera’s shareholding in the 
Irish Press. The yearly returns lodged with the Irish Companies Registration Offices 
(now located in premises on Parnell Street formerly owned by the Irish Press) are 
incomplete and in poor condition. However, it is possible to get some idea of de 
Valera’s shareholding. The first return relates to 1928, the year the Irish Press was 
incorporated. De Valera is listed as owning 500 shares, the minimum amount for a 
director laid down in the company’s articles of association. His stake remains at 500 
until 1934, when he ceases to be listed as a director, yet his shareholding increases in 
that year to 51,140. He is again listed as a director in 1935, with a shareholding of 
51,910. There is no indication of where the extra shares came from, nor why he 
relinquished his directorship in 1934. In 1937, his shareholding increased to 55,578 
and then fell to 120 in 1938 and subsequent years.
It is possible to speculate on the mysteries of these returns: in 1934, de Valera’s son 
Vivion joined the board, and it is generally accepted that it was at this time that de 
Valera handed over the day to day running of the Irish Press to him. This may explain 
de Valera’s absence from the list of directors in that year. The extra shares under his 
ownership in 1934 may represent funds contributed by the American side of the 
fundraising operation, although the figures do not tally with the 47% stake in the Irish 
Press reportedly owned by the Irish Press American Corporation. The drop in his 
shareholding in 1937 may be related to the commencement of his second term as 
Taoiseach. However, this is impossible to confirm. It is known, however, that Vivion
de Valera joined the board in 1934, became managing director and editor-in-chief in 
1951, and controlling director in 1959, when his father was elected president.
2.9 Conclusion
Drawing the strands o f the various arguments together, it is not difficult to see how de 
Valera became convinced (i) that a Republican daily paper was needed and (ii) that it 
could be financially viable. For over a decade, he had been at the receiving end of a 
hostile press. During his visit to the US, he had seen the effects of favourable 
publicity, and his experiences there also served to highlight the inadequacies of the 
existing Republican journals back home. He also became convinced that, given the 
support for Fianna Fail at the 1927 elections, a Republican newspaper could achieve a 
circulation larger than those of the Irish Times and the Cork Examiner, both of which 
were profitable organisations. The penetration into the Irish market of British 
newspapers like the Daily Mail and the News of the World also made an impression 
on him. These newspapers propagated a world view centred on the British Empire that 
was as repugnant to him as it was seductive to the Catholic middle classes.
It was at this time too several important characteristics of the Irish Press emerged. 
These were: the establishment of the role of the Controlling Director, the paper’s 





A paper at last, and an editor
3.1 Introduction
Reading the contemporary accounts of the launch of the Irish Press, it is difficult to 
escape the atmosphere of excitement surrounding its first issue on September 5, 1931. 
Douglas Gageby, later an editor of the Evening Press and the Irish Times recalls his 
father bringing him a copy of the first issue. “ ‘Dev has brought out a new paper,’ he 
told me. He brought it to me when I was home sick from school. He was very excited 
about it.” (Interview with the author, 24.10.97). The new paper was an immediate 
success, and its circulation maintained a generally upward trend over its first five 
years of existence. (NLI: 18361).
The initial circulation figures show that there was a ready market of readers willing to 
buy the new paper, but other difficulties mitigated against the Irish Press being an 
unqualified success. There were problems in securing advertisements for the new 
paper, and a dispute over the distribution of the paper on a train shared by its two 
rivals deprived it of revenue in the early days.
Whatever its advertising and distribution problems, the paper was at least blessed in 
its choice of editor. Frank Gallagher proved himself to be the ideal choice as the man 
to launch the editorial operation of the Irish Press. He was a painstaking editor, as his
daily schedule shows, and worked hard to bring de Valera’s vision of “a paper as Irish 
as the London Times is English” (NLI: 18361) to fruition.
The new paper was hit by a builders’ strike just weeks before the launch date, but the 
workers agreed to return to work without the pay rise they were seeking. In the period 
under review, the Irish Press was affected by several industrial disputes, one of which 
led indirectly to Gallagher’s eventual resignation. And, even before publication, 
Gallagher had several economies imposed on him, not least of which was his own 
salary: he expected £1,000 a year, but got £850, 15 per cent short of what he asked. 
(NLI: 18361).
Despite the various teething troubles affecting the new paper, it was a resounding 
success with the reading public. Its early years were characterised by a reasonably 
steady increase in sales. Gallagher proved a sure hand at the tiller, and largely 
succeeded in the task he set himself in that first editorial: “a newspaper technically 
efficient in all departments, assured of material success, yet seeking above all thing 
the freedom and well-being of the nation.” (IP: September 5, 1931).
3.2 The first issue of the Irish Press
The first edition of the Irish Press rolled off the presses in the early hours of the 
morning on Saturday, September 5, 1931. The start button on the giant presses was 
pressed by Margaret Pearse, the mother of 1916 hero and nationalist icon Padraig 
Pearse. Over 200,000 copies of that first issue were sold, but little could its curious
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readers suspect the extent of the effort, wrangling, planning and plotting that had 
preceded the launch.
Like most newspaper launches, it nearly didn’t happen at all. In March 1927, the Irish 
Press bought the Tivoli Theatre in Burgh Quay, formerly the site of a music hall 
revue, but then in use as a cinema. As journalist and author Hugh Oram mentions, it 
had been the Conciliation Hall from where O’Connell led the repeal movement. “The 
Young Ireland movement had also been based there, so the building was a firm 
historical base for the new Republican-minded newspaper ... Later, when things went 
wrong, staff used to say it was still a music hall.” (Oram 1982: 171). Reconstruction 
of the building began in August 1930, but the work was halted as a Dublin-wide 
building dispute brought all building work in the capital to a standstill. As Joe Walsh, 
who joined the paper in 1934 and later became editor of the Irish Press, recalled: 
“Staff engaged were on the payroll; funds were rapidly dwindling. Nearing 
desperation, the company made an appeal to the contractors and their workers who, 
patriotically, decided to resume work at the old rates of pay.” (IP: September 5, 1981). 
The patriotic climb-down was in February 1931. Walsh continues: “The deteriorating 
economic climate also had serious repercussions: many hundreds of share holders 
who had made the initial deposit on their shares failed to complete payment, leaving a 
significant percentage of the share capital not fully paid up. Business and agriculture 
were languishing: advertising was decreasing.” Walsh’s account is backed up to some 
extent by early returns for the Irish Press in the Companies’ Office: the figures for 
1929 show that, of 124,679 shares allotted, just 64,864 were subscribed. The figures 
for subsequent years are incomplete.
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The editorial staff who were cooling their heels while the builders’ strike stretched on 
were an eclectic bunch. They were, as the first editor Frank Gallagher put it, 
comprised of “mixed elements, trained and untrained”. (NLI: 18361). Hugh Oram 
gives a comprehensive account of the first staff: Gallagher was not first choice for the 
editor’s job. Another journalist, Seamus O’Farrell, was favourite but was edged out as 
the launch date grew imminent. One of the pre-launch advisers on the Irish Press was 
Michael Rooney, who subsequently became editor of the Irish Independent. Once 
Gallagher’s appointment was confirmed, the other staff positions could be filled. 
William Sweetman, later to be appointed as editor, was London editor; Bob Egan of 
the Connacht Tribune was news editor; M J McManus was literary editor (he held this 
position until his death on holiday in Donegal in 1951, and was succeeded by 
Benedict Kiely); John Moynihan, formerly editor of the Kerry Weekly Reporter and a 
colleague of Gallagher’s from The Nation, was leader writer and assistant editor; 
James Kelly was the Irish Press’s correspondent in the North and would later become 
an editor for the Independent group; Joe Sherwood, Cumbrian-born and late of the 
Cape Times in South Africa, was sports editor; his deputy was another Englishman, 
Herbert Moxley; Mick “Sport” Byrne was racing correspondent; Mitchell Cogley, 
later sports editor of the Irish Independent, was a junior sports reporter at the time of 
the launch; Cearbhall O Dalaigh was Irish editor; his learned brother Aonghus was 
appointed librarian; Jack Dempsey was advertising manager (later general manager); 
Paddy Clare was the night reporter and one of the “mixed elements” (ie former 
gunmen) spoken of by Gallagher. (Oram 1983: 171-4).
The lead story on that historic Saturday was of the devastating floods that had swept 
through Dublin and parts of Wicklow. The front page, with its banner headline
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Emergency Measures to Aid Flood Sufferers, would have looked very brash to the 
thousands who paid one penny for the 12-page paper: it was the only national 
newspaper at the time to carry news on the front page. Both the Irish Times and the 
Irish Independent devoted their front pages entirely to advertising, and both 
published bigger editions than their fledgling competitor. The Irish Times of the day 
ran to 16 pages, while the Irish Independent had 18. The absence of small ads from 
the Press’s front page allowed Frank Gallagher to give a bolder presentation of the 
news that his rivals, but in many ways he was making a virtue of necessity: many 
advertisers were deeply suspicious of the new paper, and many businesses who had 
their base in England, or looked there for investment, would not support a newspaper 
which was so blatantly aligned with the policies of Eamon de Valera and his Fianna 
Fail party. Indeed, it was front-page news in the Irish Press when a Balrothery town 
committee voted to include the paper on the list of publications in which it placed its 
advertisements. (IP: September 9, 1931).
In its second issue, its front page contained several self-administered claps on the 
back: “The Irish Press has achieved nothing less than a national triumph,” announced 
a page-one article. “ ... Five times the great machines had to pour out new supplies. 
They could not be printed quick enough for the hands stretched out for them.” (IP: 
September 7, 1931). Another, breathlessly describing the drama of the first night of 
production, recounted:
“Mrs Pearse was waiting to press the button that would start the press revolving. It should start 
at two o ’clock; it was two o ’clock now, and how much work still to do? ... Chains o f  men 
came and went, passing and re-passing in the narrow gangways, carrying trays o f  grey metal, 
with the swift, precise teamwork o f a fire brigade in action. Editors and managers were at their 
posts, vigilant, making decisions. The Chairman o f the Board stood watching it all.
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“In another room, silent still, was the huge press, which would take the plates and the paper on 
huge rollers -  print the paper, fold it, cut it and send it out in counted piles. It was nearly three 
and the Press was silent still. The silence among the watchers was tense.
“A messenger ran in; ‘they are starting’. Down corridors and stairs we hurried, down the iron 
spiral staircase, single file; along the passage piled with immense wooden drums full o f paper, 
into the printing room. The Chairman o f the Board was there now, Mrs Pearse beside him.
Men were climbing up to the machines and calling ‘Look out’ and laying on the heavy grey 
half-cylinders o f metal that were the plates o f  the Irish Press. The watchers stood pressed 
against the walls very quiet. It was three o’clock.
“The whisper passed round: ‘each machine turns out fifty thousand an hour ...’ A shout and 
Mrs Pearse put out her hand. A hesitant cheer from the watchers as the immense rollers began 
to revolve -  and a roar that must have been heard across the Liffey as they gathered speed, 
whirled into maximum power and The Irish Press, a white cataract, fell into the trays.”
It wasn’t all greased efficiency, however, as the Press’s circulation manager later 
recalled. Some 100,000 of the 200,000 issues of that first edition missed the special 
train arranged by the Irish Press following the refusal of the other newspapers to allow 
the paper share theirs. “There were too many people in the machine room and with 
quite a lot of excitement, distribution was delayed and we missed the train.” (IP: 
September 8, 1981).
The leading article of that first issue was dramatic and stirring, too. It promised an 
Irish paper for the Irish people, and not “an indistinct echo of certain sections of the 
British Press.” That first editorial also coined the phrase “The Truth in the News”, 
which the paper adopted as its motto, and it was here also that the phrase “this great 
enterprise” was first used in relation to the Irish Press. (The full editorial is appended 
in Appendix 1.)
These worthy sentiments were conveyed to the Irish public by a variety of means, not 
all of them conventional. The Irish Independent, still run by the influential Murphy
family, used its commercial clout to get the Irish Press banned from the trains of the 
Great Southern Railway, who insisted that the new paper hire a special train to 
distribute its papers. The ban saddled the Press with a £30,000 annual cost for 
arranging its own transportation (Walsh, IP: September 5, 1981). Walsh’s account 
continues: “The train boycott was announced in August 1931, less than a week before 
publication day. This unforeseen financial burden coming on top of the delay caused 
by the building strike ate into the capital set aside for launching the paper. De Valera 
appealed to the railways tribunal and got this decision reversed. The Irish Independent 
took the matter to the High Court in August 1931, but the court upheld the original 
decision to ban the Press.”
The sales representatives of the Independent and the Irish Times encouraged 
newsagents not to stock the new journal. (Walsh, IP: September 5, 1981). The Press 
was eventually let back on the train following a piece of subterfuge from circulation 
executive Padraig O Criogain: “We showed photographs of special trucks we were 
going to buy and we had plans for a complete road distribution service. The traffic 
manager of GSR at the time got worried and persuaded the Independent to reconsider 
its position on the special train.” (IP: September 8, 1981).
Liam Pedlar, the circulation manager, an old de Valera worker in America and O 
Criogain, an ex-Clann na nGael gunrunner, were in charge of distributing the paper. 
“Pedlar drew on his gunrunning experiences to ensure that the Irish Press arrived in 
Ballyfaremote in the arms of either a Fianna Fail bus driver of a commercial traveller. 
Here it might be sold in one of the fiercely partisan shops that sold the Press or its 
rivals, but not both together. Or it might be taken on to a more remote townland by
the Fianna Fail postman, or by a small farmer returned from the morning journey to 
the creamery. In one celebrated case in north Kerry, it was brought up the side of a 
mountain by a man with a good Fianna Fail ass and cart.” (Coogan 1993: 430).
Advertising was another problem area for the new paper. De Valera’s policy of 
encouraging home industry at the expense, if need be, of British-based companies, 
was of course supported by the Irish Press. But it was most decidedly not the policy of 
the British manufacturers. And when the representatives of the Irish Press went to 
canvas the advertising agents of those British companies, they were told as much is no 
uncertain terms. One exception was the Dunlop company, which did agree to 
advertise in the Press, but not out of any feelings of affinity with its political line. 
Erskine Childers, recently graduated from Cambridge, was appointed advertising 
manager of the Press. After several attempts, he got an interview with a senior 
manager in Dunlop. Upon hearing his name, the Dunlop man insisted on knowing if 
he was “the same Childers as The Riddle o f the Sands”? Upon hearing that the young 
Irish Press man was the son of the author, the Dunlop manager agreed to place a 
series of ads, quoting from his favourite book the while. (Coogan 1995: 420).
Other advertising salesmen were not so fortunate. “The excuses as relayed to the 
paper’s advertising representatives were many and varied but seldom true - the 
readers of that paper haven’t got purchasing power ... it is only read by rapparees ... its 
policy is not in the best interests of the consumers. Yet it is clearly evident from a 
perusal of the national dailies of that period that these were not the real reasons. Large 
detergent advertisements, for example, appeared in the Irish Times, the readers of 
which were small in number and on the whole wealthy. No one believed that these
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readers did the family wash. It was seen as a form of subsidy. Finance and insurance 
institutions followed the soap companies’ lead. Solicitors, auctioneer and the smaller 
businesses, with similar prejudices, rubbed shoulders with them in this pro-British, 
snobbish attitude towards those who dared to question the Treaty or to use the Treaty 
to end our economic dependence on Britain ...” (O’Toole 1992: 59).
3.3 The role of Frank Gallagher
If de Valera was the seminal figure in Irish politics of the time, then the man he chose 
to edit the first issue of the Irish Press was no less influential in the world of 
journalism. Frank Gallagher has been largely ignored by historians, most of whom, as 
Sarah Binchy points out in her work on Gallagher, have used his extensive archive of 
material in the National Library as a prism through which de Valera is examined 
(Binchy 1992: 1). Ms Binchy’s study of Gallagher stressed the pivotal role Gallagher 
played in the formation of the Irish Press. My work in this chapter differs from hers in 
that it emphasises more Gallagher’s struggle for funds, which is significant when set 
in the context of the Press’s overall financial situation.
His journalistic career began on the Cork Free Press, a weekly paper owned by Home 
Rule MP William O’Brien. Gallagher describes his relationship with O’Brien as “like 
father like son”. (Gallagher 1953: 225). He recalls sitting in O’Brien’s Westminster 
chambers and listening to his mentor reminisce about the days of Parnell, the Land 
League and the growth of the Home Rule movement. At the age of 21, he was 
appointed the paper’s London correspondent. It was an exciting time to be in London: 
the war with Germany was beginning, and for somebody as politically aware as
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Gallagher, there was no shortage of copy. Privately, as a letter dated September 17, 
1914, to his then girlfriend Celia Saunders shows, he was pro-German, but a stiff 
reminder from William O'Brien put him back on the path of political correctness. 
(NLI: 10050).
Gallagher’s loyalties were severely tested by the 1916 Rising, but his sympathies 
were already with the rebels. He had joined the Irish Volunteers in Cork in 1913 and 
had attended drills. His influence can be seen in the coverage given to the Rising in 
the Cork Free Press: it began by being outraged at the destruction wreaked on Dublin 
city, progressed through a sneaking admiration to the “misguided but brave young 
men” (CFP: May 6, 1916) and ended up by attacking the government for the 
treatment of prisoners. At the time of the Rising, Gallagher was back in Cork as the 
editor of the paper, but he travelled to London to try to persuade O’Brien to take a 
more lenient line on the insurgents. The subsequent rise of Sinn Fein as the main 
nationalist party, eclipsing the Home Rulers, meant the closure of the paper. It 
published its last issue at Christmas of 1916, and the following year Gallagher found 
himself out of a job. He was typically energetic in his pursuit of another one, even to 
the extent of canvassing the Irish Times.
After the Sinn Fein landslide in the December 1918 elections, he became a central 
figure in the mosquito press of the new movement. It was so named, he recalls, 
because “it was small, difficult to kill and had a sting that was remembered”. 
(Gallagher 1927: 348). Basically, it involved a running battle with the censor. As soon 
as a paper was banned by the censor, it was simply started up again under a new name 
and from a new location. Thus the Irish reading public was treated to a succession of
newspapers with ever various names but a remarkably similar content. It was a game 
of cat and mouse between the Irish newspapers and the British censor, and it was one 
at which Gallagher grew adept. His main opponent was Lord Decies, who wielded the 
blue pencil on behalf of Queen and Empire at the Censor’s Office in Grafton Street in 
Dublin. As a journalist on the New Ireland weekly, it was Gallagher’s job to bring the 
week’s articles to his Lordship and try to persuade, implore and trick him into passing 
for publication as much as possible. He was not always successful, as another letter to 
Celia dated August 22, 1917, shows: “Oh woe and desolation! The censor has just 
suppressed three articles which should have appeared in this week’s issue.” (NLI: 
10050). But after a while, he got the measure of the man he described, again to Celia 
in September 1918, as a “noble nonentity”. (NLI: 10050).
His methods were simple, but effective. He would arrive late and engage his Lordship 
on his favourite subject: the Turf. He dragged out the conversation, so that Lord 
Decies had to hurry through the proofs, and just as the blue pencil was wavering over 
a particularly juicy piece of anti-imperialist invective, he would start off on his 
Lordship’s second most favourite subject: income tax. His last resort was to engage 
and defeat his opponent in simple argument, “because Lord Decies was fundamentally 
honest.” He cites a typical example to Celia: “In one article, in which we were giving 
the Viceroy a drubbing, we referred to him as ‘Lord French, hero of the Mons retreat’. 
Milord reacted violently. ‘You can’t say that’. I told him his judgments were 
sometimes hasty, and he did not let himself see the real meaning of the words he 
wanted to cut. ‘You can’t deny,’ said I, ‘that he was the hero of the Mons retreat. It 
was a very difficult withdrawal, milord.’ ‘Difficult,’ he exploded, ‘it was the most 
masterly military manoeuvre of the whole war!’ ‘Well,’ said I, ‘that’s what we’re
saying: Lord French, hero of the most masterly military manoeuvre of the whole war.’ 
‘Yes,’ the poor man said, puzzled, ‘but you don’t mean that.’ ‘But you have just said 
yourself, Lord Decies, that that’s what the words mean.’ He gave me a long, pained 
and baffled look, but the phrase was saved.” (NLI: 10050).
In 1919, Gallagher moved to the Irish Bulletin, under the editorship of Erskine 
Childers. Here he learned to respect the facts: “Any exaggerations that remained from 
our pruning were cut out. All too-eager statements were brought down to a calmer 
note, for he [Childers] was a lover of the unembellished truth.” (Gallagher 1927: 119). 
The Bulletin died with Childers’s execution before the Treaty. Gallagher moved to the 
anti-Treaty An Phoblacht. where he worked as editor until his arrest. He spent most of 
the Civil War in jail. In one of his final leading articles for An Phoblacht, he lamented 
the “dishonest and hypocritical” daily Press. (AP: March 22, 1922). Soon after his 
release, he was to embark on a mission to rectify that.
In 1922, Gallagher was already in correspondence with de Valera over the possibility 
of starting a propagandist national newspaper. But it was nearly 10 years before his 
and de Valera’s dream of a truly Irish national paper was born. In the meantime, 
Gallagher took the post of publicity officer of the newly formed Fianna Fail party, and 
accompanied de Valera on his fundraising trips for the new paper, writing stirring 
speeches for the Chief. He accompanied de Valera to the US twice in 1927 on fund­
raising trips. He was a loyal supporter of the Chief; indeed he was preparing a 
biography of de Valera at the time of his death in 1962. He was generally regarded as 
a sound man by the nationalist camp in Irish politics, and he seemed the natural 
choice to edit de Valera’s “great enterprise”. He formally applied for the job in a
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letter dated November 15, 1930, stating “I would expect a salary of £1,000 a year with 
yearly increments to a maximum of £1,200.” The reply, from company secretary 
Robert Brennan, was the first of many economies foisted on Gallagher by the board: 
he was offered the job at a salary of £850 a year. (NLI: 19361).
It was Gallagher’s great challenge and great frustration to be involved in the design of 
a new newspaper from the ground up. He was involved in decisions concerning 
everything from the layout of the front page to the layout of the newsroom. On 
December 29, 1930, company secretary Brennan writes:
“Would you be good enough to let me have at your earliest convenience, your scheme of 
organisation for the Editorial Department, with particular reference to the points o f contact 
with the other departments.
“For the purposes o f your draft scheme, you may assume that we will start some time in June, 
or perhaps earlier, issuing at a penny, a morning paper o f 12 pages, Daily Mail size, and that 
we will have to take into consideration the possibility o f developing towards a greater number 
o f  pages for the morning paper, and the issuing later on o f an evening paper, a weekly and 
Sunday newspaper.
(NLI: 19361)
Other missives concern the arrangements for the Irish Press’s foreign coverage, the 
hiring of local correspondents throughout the country, the distribution of the new 
paper. His work schedule describes a working day which began at 11.30am and 
continued until 3.0am the next day:
11.30am: Read morning papers and compare our stories and treatments to theirs.
1.0-2.0pm: lunch.
2.0-3.0pm: thorough sifting through English papers.
4.30pm: leave for office.
5.0-6.0pm: see news editor, discuss contents, hear o f that day’s stories, read Cork Examiner.
7.30-8.0pm: Leader w riters’ conference.
8.15-8.30pm: General conference, all executives attend. Chief Sub, News Editor, Leader
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Writers, Irish Editor, Make-up Editor, Sports Editor, Art Editor, Editorial Secretary. Editor 
presiding. Short discussion o f that day’s paper, mistakes pointed out, criticisms heard, 
proposals for special stories, pictures, changes, etc. News list for coming day read, general 
advice given on particular stories (to be handled carefully, or splashed, or back-paged, or 
referred to Ed). Comments on news list. Space allocation arranged. (Sport is heavy, wants two 
columns from news; news is pressed, wants space from sport, features, finance etc.)
8.30-8.45pm: Picture conference. Picture list read, values discussed, pages where to appear 
arranged. Suggestions for photographers. (Picture conference attended by Art Editor, Chief 
Sub, News Editor, Make-Up Editor). Art Editor takes list o f pictures required (what is to go 
where, so that they shall be ready in the required order -  pictures for early pages needed first 
etc).
8.45-9.15pm: Callers interviewed.
9 .15-10.0pm: Correspondence dealt with.
10.0-10.15pm: See Financial Editor and Woman Editor, check on sports misses and see Sports 
Editor.
10.15-10.30pm: Signing o f important letters.
10.30-11.0pm: Cutline (traditional newspapers’ production break).
11.0-11,30pm: Deal with political copy and speeches requiring “policy” heads.
11.30-12.0midnight: Supervision o f editorials.
12.0midnight-l .30am: The rush hour. Proofs gone through if  possible; picture page passed; 
ticklish copy referred to editor dealt with; editorials revised in proof; lead discussed in 
conference with chief sub; short visit to stone if  required to push the paper through the last 15 
minutes.
1.30-2.0am: Rest and tag ends dealt with.
2.0-3.0am Read Independent for “sticks” (exclusive stories or stories at which the opposition 
excels).
One of the tasks unmentioned here was that of replying to hundreds of supplicants 
applying for jobs of every description. Some letters were from mothers on behalf of 
their worthy sons, some were from IRA veterans who had once helped out de Valera 
in the Civil War. De Valera’s secretary passed them all on to Gallagher. The






I am a sister o f Tomas Agas [Ashe], and one o f my boys aged 20 had applied for a position as 
reporter to the Irish Press.
I am writing to yourself personally to secure this job.
I have four grown up sons ranging in ages from 17 to 2 1 .1 have applied for places for them 
again and again and every time in vain.
Now this opportunity has occurred in our own party and I hope as Tomas’s sister you will do 
me this favour. My heart is set on it as I detest emigration, and so do these boys.
This boy aged 20 is secretary to Fianna Fail Comhairle Cumami and also GAA and in 
appearance and manner is Tomas over again.
The eldest 21 could do work on the premises, he is hardworking and healthy, such men will be 
employed around the works as porters and such.
Could you kindly get him in on some job there. Both these boys have the passage tickets to 
America, w on’t you help me dear sir to save them from such a fate.
Thanking you in anticipation, le meas mor,
Maire Devane.
If genius is an infinite capacity for taking pains, then Gallagher was a true genius. His 
attention to detail was legendary. He even took time to write to his correspondent in 
Kilrush, Co Clare, about the accuracy of her pig market reports. The entire fascinating 
correspondence has been preserved by Ann Gallagher, Frank’s daughter. One 
commentator synopsised it as follows:
“Letter to shareholder {who had originally written complaining that the pig prices were at 
tunes 10 shillings o ff the mark} thanking him for his interest, explaining that there had been a 
bit o f  this in the past and that ‘strong letters’ may be necessary to keep the correspondents in 
line. Memo to sub to find out the correspondent’s name, stern letter to her, indignant reply 
from her viz: ‘I am a reporter for over 10 years and can say that any o f my reports were never 
contradicted...’ She explains that individual prices may differ; she sticks to standard ones. To 
do otherwise would ‘take a column in your paper’. Letter from Gallagher including text o f 




Another example of his meticulousness is his protracted negotiations with British 
United Press, an agency for British and foreign news. He was at pains in February 
1931 to remind one J C Moore of the BUP that
“We intend to cover as large a field as possible, of foreign news -  and by the way our paper 
will regard Ireland as a unit and not the Free State only, which, as you know, is not the whole 
country ... I f  we take BUP, we shall hope to secure from it the best possible news service ... 
from an angle which will be unbiased and not propagandist.”
An interesting dispute follows some solecism on behalf of a BUP correspondent over
a matter of Catholic rite (he described a South American bandit celebrating, rather
than merely attending, Mass every day). “As a precaution against just such
happenings, we have a Catholic on our London staff,” a po-faced Gallagher informed
Mr Moore. In a later letter, Mr Moore gets another broadside (June 2): “I would like
to say that the representation of South American nationalists and others as bandits
seems to us here to be hostile propaganda. It is not long ago since the news agencies
described our own National Leaders as ‘gunmen’ so that we are sensitive to the truth
in matters of this kind.” (NLI: 18366).
Gallagher’s politics are evident in the list of matters he wants covered by the BUP’s 
journalists. Anything that showed Britain up, anything that showed her colonies 
resisting British authority, any criticism of British foreign policy by other nations was 
to be given prominence. When people with Irish names were in the news, he wanted 
extensive coverage. He cites a recent rescue in which Irish people were involved, 
“though in none of the English reports did we get credit for these men”. At the end of 
this volley o f letters, he bargains the hapless Moore down to £550 a year for the 
service, £150 less than the opening offer.
Not that it was all work and no play in those more genteel days. A letter from Aodh
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de Blacam thanking him for an appointment to the paper concludes: “Would the 
coming Friday suit yourself and Mrs Gallagher for a drive to Glendalough?” (NLI:
18366). Back at the paper, Gallagher’s energy and capacity for taking pains became 
legendary. He was rigorous in his instructions to his staff; his general injunction to 
those both writing for and editing the new paper was: “Remember, Ireland matters 
most to the Irish Press.”
It was of course in keeping with the founding principles of the paper that it should 
seek a perspective on home and foreign news other than a British one. In a list of 
instructions to the first team of sub-editors hired by the paper was included a warning:
“Be on your guard against the habits o f  British and foreign news agencies who look at the 
world mainly though imperialist eyes.” Other instructions were:
Always give the Irish angle in headlines;
Do not use agency headlines: the other papers will have these.
Do not pass the word “bandits” as a description o f South American revolutionaries.
Pirates and robbers in China are not necessarily communists and therefore should not be 
described as such.
These agency stories show an ignorance of Catholic practices and things: check all doubtful 
references in such copies.
Propagandist attacks on Russia and other countries should not be served up as news.
Do not make the Irish Press a Dublin paper - there are O ’Connell streets in other cities too. 
Ireland matters most to the Irish Press.
Every good journalist while he is writing is one o f his own readers.
A good reporter or a good sub-editor can make almost any story live. A bad one can kill the 
best story ever thought of.
Write simple English: long words can be a trial to subs, comps and most of all to the reader. 
Attempts as a “literary” style is the worst form o f bad journalism.
Verily all quotations.
Acknowledge everything o f  importance taken from other papers.
When in doubt, find out.
Give the main facts o f  the story in the opening paragraphs. Keep the others for minor details. 
People do not buy the paper for puzzles -  explanatory footnotes are always good copy.
I f  you don’t understand your copy, the public won’t.
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Women and children first -  if  there is a side to a story or illustrations o f  interest to women 
don’t ignore it.
Remember the Free State is not Ireland and “Northern Ireland” is not either Northern Ireland 
or Ulster - it is the Six Counties.
(NLI: 18361).
It is interesting to note that the new paper is so concerned about the descriptions of 
insurgents in other countries. Perhaps this desire to be scrupulously impartial in 
describing the activities of rebels abroad stems from a memory of the treatment of 
Sinn Féin leaders like de Valera at the hands of the British press, in which they were 
described in pejorative terms not long before. Nor did he want his reporters kow­
towing to the establishment, in which neither he nor de Valera had any great faith at 
the time. “It is not necessary to report every word of praise spoken to a policemen,” 
he told his newsroom staff, adding that they should not include in their copy judges 
jokes “unless they are real jokes”.
His concern that the Irish Press be a reliable source of news is also evident from his 
correspondence with the United Press Association, a leading American news agency 
at the time. “Should it finally be decided that we take your service,” he wrote to the 
British manager of the agency, “I hope that we shall get some form of news of 
America other than is now supplied by agencies as a whole, namely an amalgam of 
gangster activities, divorces at Reno, Hollywood stories and prohibition raids. When 
one realises that America is a continent with intense political and cultural activity, it 
seems a shame that more is not heard of her nobler aspects.” (NLI: 18361).
Gallagher’s efforts at maintaining journalistic standards at the Irish Press paid 
dividends in terms of circulation. As his own tally of the circulation the of the first 
five years shows, the Irish Press recorded a more or less steady increase in sales:
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3.3 A political staff for a political paper
It was natural in those days that a paper that unashamedly set out to give Irish 
Republicanism a voice should have attracted party activists and sympathisers to its 
standard. But the extent of the synergy between the Irish Press and the Fianna Fail 
party seems to modem eyes to be remarkable and is further evidence of the close ties 
between party and paper. Robert Brennan, the first company secretary, went on to 
become Irish Ambassador to Washington. Cearbhall O Dalaigh, the paper’s first Irish 
language editor, was a successful Fianna Fail candidate for the presidency. Frank 
Gallagher was the recipient of Fianna Fail patronage, being appointed to the censor’s 
office during the Emergency, and then to posts in the Government Information
Service, RTE and the Department o f Health. Erskine Childers, the Press’s first 
advertising manager, also served as a Fianna Fail President. From the perspective of 
an age that values journalistic impartiality, the extent of the open partisanship of the 
early Press days is remarkable. Aodh de Blacam, who wrote the popular Roddy the 
Rover column, was a member for a time of the Fianna Fail sub-committee on 
publicity, as was Liam Pedlar, the paper’s circulation manager. And of course, two of 
the three controlling directors of the paper -  Eamon de Valera and Vivion de Valera 





The Irish Press was immediately a great success, and the circulation of its rival, the 
Irish Independent, fell from 150,000 to 120,000 following its launch. (The Bell: Feb 
1945; P386). The populist approach adopted by Frank Gallagher appealed to readers. 
The Fianna Fail party too benefited from the favourable publicity the new paper 
afforded them. The fortunes of the paper mirrored those of the party to a surprising 
extent, as we shall see. The early years of political commitment in the 1930s brought 
party and paper great success. The sense of mission was palpable in the speeches of 
the party leaders, as it was in the leading articles of the paper. The relationship 
between the paper and the party was mutually beneficial: the party supporters 
subscribed to the paper, and the paper supported the party, not only “by confirming 
the convictions of the faithful, but also by converting previous non-voters or even 
unbelievers. The increasing turnout, from 69 per cent in the September 1927 election 
to 77 per cent in 1932, before rising to a record 81.3 per cent in 1933, probably owed 
a good deal to the popular enthusiasm generated by the Press”. (Lee 1989: 168). 
Douglas Gageby, who first came across the paper as a Belfast schoolboy, reflects the 
opinion of many: “It had a great smack about it.” (Interview with the author 
24.10.97). But the problems evident in the run-up to publication -  the lack of funds, 
the unwieldy corporate structure -  continued in the background, masked by the 
popular success of the new paper.
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Chapter 4 
The Irish Press 1932-1948
4.1 Introduction
The early years of this period represented a time of great activity and growth for the 
Irish Press, while the later years brought stasis and atrophy. The run-up to the General 
Election of 1932 was a hectic and heady period. The paper’s circulation was growing 
and, with, for example, the editor’s prosecution for seditious libel in February 1932 
and the launch of the Evening Press in the October of the same year, there is a feeling 
of the Irish Press being at the centre of events. As one writer points out, “For the first 
year of its life, the Irish Press was especially radical.” (O’Brien, 2000, P71), When 
Fianna Fail was elected to government in 1932, the tone of the Irish Press changed to 
accommodate the new circumstances of its political masters. With the subsequent re- 
election of Fianna Fail in January 1933, June 1935 and June 1943, the tone of the 
paper became ever more conservative and didactic. This was also a period in which 
the problems which beset the Irish Press company and came to prominence. Almost 
from the day of publication, editor Frank Gallagher was in conflict with the board 
over editorial budgets. During the last 15 years of its existence, publication of the 
Irish Press was frequently disrupted by industrial action; its first years were also 
punctuated by disputes o f various kinds, and during Gallagher’s time, the treatment of 
a wages clerk led to a strike and also, in part, to Gallagher’s eventual resignation. The 
close links between the Fianna Fail party and the paper were forged during this 
period. The party had a proprietorial attitude to the paper, almost regarding it as
another arm of government. The paper’s support for the party forced it into many 
rhetorical shifts and contortions. Towards the end of this period, when a progressive 
wing of Fianna Fail began to emerge, led by Sean Lemass, the paper became tom 
between support for this new guard and loyalty to the party’s old guard, led by the 
more conservative Sean McEntee. It was also during this period that the complicated 
and inflexible financial structure of the Irish Press company was put in place. The 
establishment of the Irish Press Corporation, examined in the previous chapter, and 
the continuing shortfall in share allocation, meant the company was never on as sound 
a financial footing as it had planned to be.
4.2 The Irish Press- making the argument
Fianna Fail’s campaign for the 1932 general election -  the first election since the Irish 
Press was launched -  was based on a policy of anti-imperialism and national 
development. De Valera supported small scale industries set in rural communities, 
distrusting large conglomerates and their motives towards Ireland. Fianna Fail 
opposed the link between Ireland’s currency and sterling, and objected to the way in 
which British manufacturers were allowed to sell below-cost in Ireland, so forcing 
native manufacturers out of business. The Irish Press was bom into turbulent times. 
The Irish Press’s appearance was timely in one sense: the Great Depression was at its 
height, as was ordinary people’s distrust of international high finance; sterling had 
just collapsed and Britain had been forced to abandon the Gold Standard, so pointing 
up the danger of having Ireland’s currency allied to an economy outside her control; 
the League of Nations was in disarray over its failure to rescue world trade, seeming
to prove how small nations were at the mercy of large in matters of international 
trade. These issues “provided the newspaper with ample opportunity to make the case 
for Fianna Fail’s programme of national self-sufficiency”. (Curran 1994: 160).
In the first seven months of its existence, the editorial stance of the Irish Press closely 
mirrored Fianna Fail policy. The paper supported calls for protectionist policies, 
called for independent banking system, as per Fianna Fail policy, supported Fianna 
Fail’s call for an Irish central bank after British banks forced an interest rate rise on 
their Irish counterparts.
As Catherine Curran points out, other campaigns in those early days of the Irish Press 
closely mirrored Fianna Fail policy. The paper took up cudgels on behalf of 
railwaymen employed by the Great Southern Railway, who were battling against lay­
offs and low pay. The paper criticised the plans for a 20 to 30% cut in the workforce 
and called for a state-run railway network to replace the monopoly operated by the 
GSR. The argument was given extra bite by the fact that the GSR was owned by the 
Murphy family, who also owned the Irish Independent newspaper. The Irish Press 
gave plentiful support to the fledgling Irish Shipping Company, founded by Staffords 
of Wexford in October 1931 in opposition to the Royal Mail Steam Packet Company, 
which had run a monopoly up to then. The paper then went into battle against the 
practice of “dumping” by foreign manufacturers (various campaigns targeted cheap 
Russian suits, tinned salmon and sugar) on the vulnerable Irish market. In each of 
these cases, Frank Gallagher’s editorials were at pains to point out the need for state 
intervention to regulate industry and take it out of the hands of monopolies, for a 
government dedicated to providing full employment, for protection of Irish industries
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against large-scale foreign production, all of which were planks in Fianna Fail’s 
election platform. (Curran: 1996; P I60 etseq).
The Press was also keen to establish both its own and the party’s Roman Catholic 
credentials. After all, fewer than 10 years before, many of the party faithful were 
involved in armed struggles of which the Catholic Hierarchy did not officially 
approve. Nine months after the election, the Press announced that Fianna Fail had 
“translated the sweetness of Christianity into social progress ... bank deposits have 
risen, savings in the form of Post Office certificates have enormously increased, bank 
clearances have gone up...[Fianna Fail’s social policy was] “Christianity translated 
into economics. There is no social or economic change Fianna Fail has proposed or 
brought about which had its fullest justification in the encyclicals of either Leo XIII or 
the present Pontiff.” (IP: January 23, 1933). Another author has noted that Fianna 
Fail’s policies in the early 1930s were “an amalgam of nationalist and quasi-socialist 
policies often stolen from the manifestos of left-wing Republican organs, tempered by 
Gaelic antiquarianism and Catholic social teaching found in Papal encyclicals.”
(Daly: 1992; P61)
As the 1932 general election neared, the propaganda war intensified. Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s basic appeal to voters was that the country had enjoyed unprecedented 
prosperity in the preceding decade. Government spokesmen attempted to link Fianna 
Fail with communism. Their attacks were taken up by the Irish Independent. A typical 
headline of the time in the Independent was: “FF Policy Of State Ownership -  Soviet 
Parallel”. (II: January 30, 1932). The Irish Press fought back by using every
opportunity to point out that the government was being backed by both the Unionists 
and the British government.
During this pre-election period, in January and February of 1932, one of the topics 
aired at length in the Irish Press was the treatment of IRA prisoners and suspects by 
the Free State Government. With a steady flow in information from his IRA sources, 
Gallagher was able to expose systematic brutality against Republicans by the Garda 
Siochana, arguing that “the beating of prisoners appeared to be becoming part of the 
system of government”. (IP, September 5, 1932). He also berated the awful conditions 
under which many prisoners were held in the Free State’s prisons in a series of 
stinging editorials. At that time, attacks against the forces of the Free State 
Government were frequent, and a Special Powers Tribunal -  in effect martial law -  
had been set up to dispense summary justice. On February 5, 1932, Gallagher was 
brought before this military tribunal and charged with seditious libel over his series of 
articles. The prosecution charged that he was trying to “bring the administration of the 
law into disrepute and to scandalise and vilify the Government and the Garda 
Siochana.” (National Archives: S, 2858). Gallagher argued that they were fair 
criticism. After the testimony of over 50 witnesses was published, the general public 
was beginning to agree with him . The timing of the trial could not have been more 
unfortunate for the Provisional Government: polling day for the next election had 
been set for February 16. Gallagher’s counsel concluded his summing up on the eve 
of polling day thus: “I doubt not but that the members of the Tribunal will secure to 
their countrymen the right and liberty of exposing injurious, tyrannical power by 
speaking the truth.” (IP: February 16, 1932).
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A fine of just £100 was imposed on the newspaper and the prosecution’s costs were 
refused, the verdict being delivered the day after polling day. The paper’s readers 
responded by sending in £500 in contributions to help pay the fine. “The whole saga 
ultimately helped raise the public profile of the paper and it soon built up a reputation 
as the best paper in the country for hard accurate news, with its circulation being 
boosted by the publicity surrounding the trial.” (O’Brien: 2001, P40).2
The Irish Press was predictably upbeat when de Valera and his cabinet took their 
seats: “All good Irishmen have cause for rejoicing in the events which occurred 
yesterday in the Dail” it said as it hailed Fianna Fail’s majority of 13 and accused 
Cosgrave’s Cumann na nGaedheal of being out of touch with the people. (IP: March 
10, 1932). And so the Irish Press had fulfilled the function de Valera had envisaged 
for it: it had given Fianna Fail a mouthpiece, challenged Cumann na nGaedheal and 
the newspapers which supported it, and helped Fianna Fail into office. It also helped 
legitimise Fianna Fail as “the political wing of the cultural nationalist ideologies 
published on a daily basis in the paper.” (O’Brien: 2000; P29). As de Valera wrote in 
1932 to Archbishop Mannix in Australia, “had the risk [of founding the Irish Pressl 
not been taken, I doubt if  the present government would be in power.” (De Valera 
papers: 1453/1).
Indeed the role of the Irish Press in helping Fianna Fail into power became the subject 
of a heated debate in Dail Eireann in 1933 (Dail Debates, Vol 48, Col 1880 et seq). 
Deputy Michael Cleary of Fianna Fail accused Cumann na nGaedheal leader William
2 The quotation is from M ark O ’B rien’s 2001 book De Valera, Fianna Fail and the Irish Press, which 
is based on O ’Brien’s 2000 PhD thesis The Truth in the News? A Socio-Historical Analysis o f the 
Relationship Between Fianna Fail and the Irish Press. This quotation appears in the book, but not in 
the thesis. Unless otherwise stated, all quotations from O ’Brien are from the earlier work.
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Cosgrave of being upset because “the Irish Press, it must be admitted, played a big 
part in removing Deputy Cosgrave across the floor of the house.” Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s James FitzGerald-Kenny replied that the paper was “a political 
pamphlet, pure and simple”. De Valera rose to defend the paper, stating that it was not 
“a party newspaper in the sense of a party controlled organ.” Fianna Fail, he said, “did 
not own or control it”; rather, the shareholders owned it and the policy was 
“controlled by the Board of Directors”. De Valera would intervene in the running of 
the paper only if the paper “were to depart from.. .supporting the movement for Irish 
independence and.. .the policy of economic independence also.”
De Valera persisted in public denials that the Irish Press was a party newspaper while 
at the same time (i) holding the post of Controlling Director and Editor-in-Chief, and 
(ii) monitoring the paper’s coverage of political events, and changing articles and 
pages of the paper if he saw fit. Former Irish Times journalist Frank Kilfeather, 
whose father T.P. Kilfeather was a political reporter with the Irish Press in the 1930s, 
has given this account:
“It was disingenuous o f Dev to say that the paper wasn’t owned and controlled by Fianna 
Fail. He ran it and his son ran it after him and another de Valera was running it when it closed. 
So for 50 years it was de Valera controlled. And Dev was [his italics] Fianna Fail. The party, 
right up to the day it closed, believed, quite correctly, that it would get full support [from the 
Press papers] during a general election. As a political reporter in the old, barnstorming days of 
the Press, my father was close to Dev. He used to tell me stories about Dev phoning the 
newsroom every night to know what was coming out in the paper the next day. He often had 
no hesitation in changing copy, in changing a whole front page. My father covered many o f 
Dee’s election campaigns. After giving a speech, Dev would come over to Dad and ask him to 
read back certain passages. I f  he was not satisfied, he would amend it. He would even change 
the grammar. He was a stickler for d e ta il . . .”
(Kilfeather 1997: 148).
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Despite the immediate success of the Irish Press in terms of both its circulation and its 
effect on the fortunes of Fianna Fail, financial difficulties remained. The situation had 
improved by 1932, but not dramatically. In a handbill circulated in February 1932, 
there is an almost plaintive cry for investors:
“40,000 shares still available for subscription -  The Directors o f the Irish Press are being 
urged to enlarge the present issue ... They do not feel justified in doing this until the full 
amount o f the capacity originally asked for has been secured. They are also being asked to 
launch an Evening as well as a Weekly paper. The capital o f  £200,000 was fixed as the 
minimum necessary to establish and run successfully a full series o f national newspapers. O f 
this sum, 160,000 shares o f £1 0s. Od. each were applied for and allotted, and the Directors 
were forced to confine the activities o f  the company to the production o f  a Daily newspaper 
only. That newspaper, in its seven m onths’ existence, has already established itself as the 
popular national journal o f  Ireland, and has rendered signal service to the nation. It is felt that 
the time is now propitious for a forward stride and that this is the time for all to give a helping 
hand in making secure the position o f  this great national newspaper undertaking. There are 
40,000 shares of £1 0s. Od. each still available for subscription . . .” A year later, the company 
was still almost 40,000 short o f  its target o f 200,000. It had accumulated losses o f £98,115. 
(Irish Companies Registration Office).
4.3 The Evening Press and Evening Telegraph
Some of those losses may be due in part to a short-lived attempt to introduce an 
evening paper in the summer of 1932. The original publicity material designed to 
attract investors to the Irish Press also mentioned plans for an evening and a Sunday 
newspaper. Less than a year after the daily began publication, the Evening Press was 
launched. A brighter paper than its morning sister, its layout was less densely packed. 
It contained eight pages and cost one penny. Its first issue, published on Friday, June 
3, 1932, sold 100,000 copies. (EP, June 4, 1932). This figure may be treated with 
caution, as it was carried in the second issue of the evening paper. Records of its staff
are difficult to come by. Its last issue was published in October 1932, a mere five 
months after its first. In all probability, it was produced by the same reporting staff as 
the Irish Press, but had a small sub-editing staff o f its own.
Like its sister paper, it greeted its readers with confidence, but struck a less serious 
note, remarking that it: “means to be a bright paper. Those who read evening papers 
want to feel happy about it. The day’s work is done, the day itself is closing. The 
Evening Press will remember that, and in its make-up, its features and its manner of 
presenting news it will avoid dullness and have life on every page.” (The editorial in 
full is appended in Appendix 2.)
The rhetoric of the leader was complimented by a plethora of news stories of a 
religious bent. The Eucharistic Congress had the population in a frenzy of liturgical 
activity. “450,000 People On Retreat In Advance Of Eucharistic Congress” said the 
lead story of that first edition. Other editions carried pictures o f Catholic priests on 
retreat/being ordained. There was a series by the great Republican writer Dorothy 
McArdle called “Seven Days in the Hills -  a series of six articles which offer a seven- 
day plan for exploring the hills and glens of Leinster in a small car”. There was a 
series on how to build your own radio set. It carried late news and racing results up to 
5.0pm. There was too a discemable attempt to treat stories in a lighter way. This was 
apparent in the coverage of the Eucharistic Congress itself. Eschewing long reports of 
the proceedings, the Evening Press ran the headline: “Count McCormack In Papal 
Robes Mistaken For Mussolini”.
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Less than a month into publication, the Evening Press carried a front-page report that
it intended to change its name to the Evening Telegraph. (EP: June 6, 1932). 
“Numerous readers,” read the report, “have suggested that, owing to the similarity 
between its name and that of the Irish Press, it is desirable that a change be made ... 
On Monday June 30 the Evening Press will be known as the Evening Telegraph.” 
Independent Newspapers, however, threw a spanner in the works. The title of Evening 
Telegraph was the property of the Freeman’s Journal, a paper they had taken over 
some years before and had incorporated into the Daily Irish Independent. They went 
to court to protect what they saw as illegal use of a title to which they owned the 
rights. The court heard how Independent Newspapers bought the Freeman’s Journal 
and the title of the Evening Telegraph for £24,000 when the Journal went into 
liquidation in 1924.
During the course of the trial, evidence was given that newsboys had difficulty 
shouting “Evening Press stop press!” whereas “Herald stop press!” and “Mail stop 
press!” were easy to shout. On Monday, July 18, Justice Meredith in the High Court 
delivered judgment in favour of the Irish Press company, saying that Independent 
Newspapers had in effect discarded the Evening Telegraph title. He said that 
Independent Newspapers were free to bring another case if they could prove actual 
damage caused by the name change of the Evening Press. However, the fact that the 
board of the Irish Press even considered the radical step of changing the paper’s name 
indicates a circulation situation which required a desperate remedy. The paper ceased 
publication in October of 1932. It was to be another 22 years before the Irish Press 
sallied forth again into the tempestuous waters of the evening newspaper market.
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4.4 The Irish Press: defender of the faith
Once in office, Fianna Fail set about implementing its programme of reforms, 
prominent among which were its pledge to remove the oath of allegiance to Britain, 
and to withhold the £1.5m due annually to the British government in land annuities. 
The Irish Press continued its role as amplifier for Fianna Fail policy. When the oath 
was abolished, the paper noted its removed was “as momentous as anything that had 
happened in Irish politics for many years” and that the nation owed a debt to Fianna 
Fail that was “not easy to express”. (IP: May 20, 1932). On the subject of land 
annuities, the Irish Press again supported the Fianna Fail position. When the British 
government made public a secret agreement signed by Cumann na nGaedheal 
promising to pay the annuities, the Irish Press used the disclosure to portray that party 
as unpatriotic. (O’Brien, 2000, P78). The paper supported Fianna Fail’s call to have 
the matter brought to independent international arbitration, as opposed to arbitration 
by a Commonwealth Commission as proposed by the British.
The British government responded by placing a 20% duty on Irish imports to Britain, 
thus firing the first shot in the Economic War. Fianna Fail in turn responded by 
imposing duty on imports o f coal, steel, sugar and cement. As the row worsened, the 
Irish Press sought to placate its readers, telling them that, if a trade war between 
Ireland and Britain were to happen, that Ireland would survive and emerge the 
stronger for it. The paper gave prominence to reports of support for de Valera’s stance 
in the US. When de Valera introduced tariffs on English goods, the Press again sought 
to reassure the Irish public by interviewing prominent Irish businessmen and traders 
who forcefully asserted that the country could deal with any shortages that might
arise. It also carried reports of dismay among British businessmen at the attitude of 
their government to the dispute, attempting to show that the trade war was hurting the 
British just as much as the Irish. One of the paper’s most popular columns during the 
Economic War was “An Feirmeoir Beag”, which gave guidance on self-sufficiency 
and supported Fianna Fail’s ruralisation policy throughout this period.
In many ways, the Economic War suited Fianna Fail, as de Valera could make the 
case that “frugal fare” was “the price for economic freedom”. (Fanning: 1983, PI 14). 
It also showed that, where economic and nationalist interests collided, “the latter took 
priority, at least for de Valera.” (Daly: 1992; P62). De Valera himself stated that “if 
the British succeed in beating us, then we’ll have no freedom.” (IP: Nov 19, 1932). 
When the Economic War was at its height, there were 1,900 tariffs in operation, and a 
raft of legislation had been enacted to promote “import substitution” and to regulate 
the operation of foreign-owner companies in the Irish market, but, as one 
commentator points out, the initial spurt in manufacturing output and employment in 
Ireland was short-lived and “was already over by the mid-1930s”. (O’Grada, 1997, 
P108).
In January 1933, de Valera called a snap General Election to test the reaction to his 
policies, and again the Irish Press went into rhetorical battle on behalf of the 
government, denouncing Cumann na nGaedheal as unpatriotic and noting that “in ten 
months Fianna Fail created the situation in which Britain had to yield something”. (IP, 
Jan 5, 1933). “Despite the hardship that the Economic War had so far caused, Fianna 
Fail won an overall majority; winning seventy-seven seats to Cumann na nGaedheal’s 
forty-eight.” (O’Brien, 2000, P82). Stung by coverage of the election and its results in
some British newspapers, especially the Daily Mail, the Irish Press called for a tax on 
British newspapers on sale in Ireland. (IP, Jan 27, 1933). The Fianna Fail government 
duly obliged and, in the Finance Act, 1933, there was provision for a duty on daily 
newspapers imported into the State. Subsequently, the sales of both the Irish 
Independent and the Irish Press rose, the former from 123,000 in 1935 to 134,000 in 
1937 and 140,000 in 1939, and the latter from 95,000 in 1935 to 100,000 in 1937 and 
110,000 in 1939. (The Bell. 1945, P392).
The Economic War also formed the backdrop for another controversy involving de 
Valera and the Irish Press in the early years of its existence. As we have seen, part of 
the platform on which de Valera was elected in 1932 and re-elected the following year 
was the withholding of land annuities from Britain. Both de Valera and the British 
sought to secure American opinion on their side of the dispute. Britain scored a 
propaganda point by announcing that they were going to meet the war debt 
repayments to the US despite the fact that (i) most other European countries were 
defaulting on theirs, and (ii) Ireland’s refusal to pay land annuities was an additional 
drain on Chancellor Neville Chamberlain’s purse. As one biographer notes “for de 
Valera, who was always particularly conscious of American opinion, the whole thing 
was particularly disturbing, especially at this time, but it did not take him long to pull 
a propaganda stroke of his own ...” (Dwyer 1991: 178). The stroke referred to was the 
decision to repay the Republican Loan in the US, with a 25% premium added.
The decision did get him out of his American difficulty: with US public opinion 
enraged by European countries defaulting on their debts, the announcement that 
Ireland was moving to repay hers before they fell due -  and with a bonus -  made front
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page headlines across the US. It also had a considerable effect on the finances of the 
Irish Press. When de Valera eventually got around to paying over the money promised 
in this grand gesture of January 1933, the extent of the windfall to the de Valera and 
the Irish Press became clear. In a press release issued by the Free State’s 
representative in the US on April 3, 1935, it was announced that anyone who had not 
applied for a refund under the Peters’ decision of 1927 would get $1.25 and those who 
did get a refund of 58 cents on the dollar would be paid the balance of 67 cents. The 
amount due to de Valera and the Irish Press as a result of thousands of American 
bondholders signing over their interest in the bonds to de Valera for the foundation of 
the new paper in 1927 was generally accepted to be about £100,000, coincidentally 
the amount the paper was in debt, according to the accounts circulated at that 
shareholders’ meeting in July 1933.
In a hot-tempered debate on the issue in the Dail over two days, (July 5 and 6, 1933), 
de Valera was accused of “looting the public purse for a party organ”. Batt O’Connor 
remarked: “The indecent haste about it is that you want to get control of the money to 
help you out of your difficulties with your daily paper ... Think of the conditions of 
the farms...the cutting of the salaries of the teachers and the civil servants ...” He 
urged de Valera to “put country before party politics and a party newspaper ...” (Dail 
Debates 1933: Vol 8, cols 1735-1986). De Valera weathered the storm and the Bill, 
paying £1.5m to the bondholders of the Republican Loan (including the £100,000 that 
would fall due to de Valera and the Irish Press") was passed. His supporters dismissed 
the controversy as an opposition fabrication: “Other charges were levelled at him for 
the methods used to finance the Irish Press of which he was a controlling director, a 
‘kept’ paper it was called. The facts that a number of Americans had transferred their
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interest in the Republican bonds to him for his journal was known, and when he 
insisted that the bondholders be repaid by the Government, his motives were deemed 
ulterior. ‘The Irish people,’ he retorted, ‘know full well that I personally never got one 
penny out of anything I did for Ireland.’ Nor did his son Vivion, who became a 
director, receive any money from the newspaper”. (Brommage 1956: 251).
4.5 The Irish Press as an arm of government
Commentators have noted that the radical, iconoclastic, populist tone of the Irish 
Press became more muted once Fianna Fail entered government. “After de Valera 
assumed office, the role of the Irish Press changed from that of a proactive to a 
reactive journal.” (O’Brien, 2000, 86). The paper’s role as the mouthpiece of the new 
government was demonstrated at the Ottawa Commonwealth Trade Conference of 
1932. The Irish Press was the only paper to have a reporter with the Irish Government 
delegation, “an indication of the new privileged status of the paper in relation to the 
State” (Curran 1994: 241). In its reports of the conference, the Press highlighted the 
dynamic, clear-sighted action of the Irish delegation in contrast to the confusion of the 
Dominions which led to the collapse of the conference. The details of the 1933 budget 
appeared in the Irish Press before they were announced in the Dail. (O’Brien, 2000, 
P83). The so-called McNeill Affair, involving a diplomatic clash between de Valera’s 
government and the Governor General, showed the extent to which the Irish Press was 
seen -  and used -  as an extension of the Fianna Fail party.
It had long been de Valera’s intention “to demean and eventually dispose o f ’ (Coogan 
1993: 456) the office of Governor General of Ireland. De Valera was happy to use the
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papers to provoke a controversy over the Governor Generalship, and later had little 
compunction in trying to reign in the same papers when the controversy took a turn 
which showed him in an unfavourable light. The controversy began with a report in 
the Irish Press on April 24, 1932, of an incident at the French Legation the day before. 
Fianna Fail ministers Frank Aiken and Sean T O Ceallaigh walked out of the function 
as soon as the Governor General arrived. The Irish Press report stated: “Later the 
Governor-General arrived. This was a surprise, and Mr O’Kelly and Mr Aiken then 
left.” On April 26, McNeill wrote to de Valera: “There can be no doubt as to the 
meaning of that categorical statement. It conveys to the public that two members of 
the Executive Council ... left the dance in consequence of my arrival ... Also, the 
Irish Press is known to be under your personal control, and statements of the kind to 
which I refer in that newspaper can only mean that that it is part of a considered 
policy that the Governor-General should be treated with deliberate discourtesy by 
members of your council and by the newspaper which you control.”
De Valera’s reply was a masterly put-down: “Whilst making allowance for your 
justifiable annoyance at the occurrence of which you complain, I must confess that the 
tone of your letter has surprised me not a little.. .As regards the Irish Press: It is a 
newspaper. It gathers its news as other newspapers do, and publishes what it gathers 
at the discretion of its editors. Any particular item of news would, it is true, be 
suppressed were I to issue an express rider to that effect, but ever since the paper was 
founded I have carefully refrained from giving any such orders ...” He went on to 
suggest that the Governor-General communicate his social engagements to the 
Government in advance so that “such an incident will certainly not occur in the 
future”. This was tantamount to asking McNeill to facilitate the Executive Council in
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boycotting all functions he attended. McNeill replied that he still insisted on an 
apology “not merely on my personal or official account, but with regard to the honour 
and self respect of Irish public life.” Again de Valera’s reply was unyielding: he 
“regarded the whole affair as unfortunate and regrettable, and one that should not 
have been permitted to occur. Further than this I am unable to go”.
Less than a month later, another incident was the occasion of more friction. McNeill 
had invited guests to stay with him in the Viceregal Lodge in the Phoenix Park during 
the Eucharistic Congress. He had sought the Government’s response to these 
invitations, but “de Valera delayed giving a decision until McNeill had committed 
himself to inviting his guests.” (Coogan 1993: 457). The Department of External 
Affairs informed McNeill that his guests were an embarrassment to the Government. 
McNeill wrote to de Valera protesting at the delaying in telling him where he stood. 
During the Congress, neither McNeill nor his party was invited to any of the official 
functions associated with the event. McNeill waited until the Congress was over 
before pressing for an apology over the way he had been treated. Unless one was 
forthcoming, he would publish the correspondence between the two men, he said. De 
Valera formally instructed him not to, but on July 10, McNeill had copies of the 
letters delivered to the city’s newspaper offices. De Valera promptly sent gardai after 
them, instructing the editors not to publish. They acquiesced. The gritty McNeill then 
sent copies to papers in the North and in the UK, who were not so easily intimidated 
by de Valera, and prepared to publish. De Valera took steps to prevent the circulation 
of the papers in the Republic, but it was too late. Realising that it was inevitable that 
the correspondence be published, he directed the Irish newspapers to publish it too. 
Once again, the editors of the Irish papers carried out his wishes.
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The reports in the daily press on Tuesday July 12, 1932, have a surreal quality about 
them, with accounts of gardai, army and other officers of the state chasing these 
letters about the city, boarding ferries and trying to intercept newspapers all over the 
place. The Irish Press’s report is typical. Headlined “Confidential Documents Given 
To The Press”, it goes on to give a timetable of events:
9.30pm (Sunday) [July 10, 1932] -  Letters delivered from Viceregal Lodge at newspaper 
offices.
11.50pm -  Message from M inister for Justice that police warning was being issued against 
publication.
12.30am (Monday) -  Telephone message from Garda Siochana that on July 8th the Executive 
Council had declared the letters “confidential State documents” which should not be 
published.
1 .30am - Instruction given to Garda Siochana to prevent circulation o f newspapers containing 
the letters.
1.50am -  Newspaper offices visited by General W R E  Murphy and two other garda officers 
to ensure no publication o f  letters would be made.
5.35am -  Garda officers at Dun Laoghaire examine incoming English papers and direct that 
Daily Herald and News Chronicle not be allowed to circulate. Similar action is taken at 
Dundalk and other Border towns.
3.30pm Following official statement issued: “In disregard o f  the advice o f the Executive 
Council formally tendered to him, the Governor-General has issued for publication certain 
letters which passed between him and the President o f  the Executive Council. As these letters 
have today appeared in foreign newspapers, the Executive Council has decided to authorise 
publication in the Irish Free State o f  the entire correspondence.
The role of the Irish Press in the incident was crucial. The paper carried the original 
account of the walk-out at the French Legation. Other newspapers carried reports of 
“gossiping comments regarding the departure of the Ministers. The statement in the 
Irish Press is not a report of gossip” (McNeill to de Valera, April 26, 1932). This 
implies that the Irish Press had access to the facts of the matter, while its rivals were 
restricted to publishing speculation. It is disingenuous for de Valera to suggest that the 
appearance in the Irish Press of this item had nothing to do with him. The newspaper 
he founded had been publishing for less than a year and, as the editorial it ran on the 
McNeill incident shows, links between the paper and its Controlling Director were 
still strong. The Irish Press described the publication of the letters by the Governor- 
General as “an act of premeditated and unprecedented disregard for his constitutional 
position.. .Not only has he disobeyed and defied, he has not hesitated to use 
everything to his hand in an attack on Mr de Valera and his Ministers... He has not 
even left the Eucharistic Congress out of his polemical letters ... We doubt if such an 
example of arrogant pettiness had been provided in our time.. .From a simple reading 
of the correspondence itself the public will learn most. On the one hand the courteous 
letters of the President of the Executive Council ... On the other hand, Mr McNeill’s 
letters are embittered, growing in rancour as the correspondence progresses.” It 
concludes that McNeill “is wholly unsuited to the position which he occupies.” (IP: 
July 12, 1932).
The new role of the Irish Press as defender of the government position was also 
demonstrated in the paper’s treatment of a plan by de Valera to reintroduce the Public 
Safety Act, the very piece of legislation under which editor Frank Gallagher had been 
prosecuted for seditious libel under the Cosgrave government. Cosgrave’s concern
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had been the activities of the IRA and other Republican groups; de Valera was 
moving against the Army Comrades Association, the Blue Shirts. The Irish Press. 
which had attacked the legislation as draconian when faced with its power in 1931, 
saw merit in its réintroduction in 1933. “Faced with the open defiance of an 
organisation whose head has himself described it as ‘a formidable insurrectionary 
force’ and potentially an extreme danger to the peace and stability of the country, the 
Free State Government... had to act.” (IP: August 23, 1933).
4.6 The resignation of Frank Gallagher
Gallagher’s editorship may have begun in a blaze of journalistic glory, but almost 
from the first, he was in conflict with the board over resources. The paper’s 
circulation was increasing, but he was having to bring out a paper with fewer staff and 
resources than his rival across the river in Abbey Street. Soon Gallagher was sending 
memos to the board bemoaning these circumstances. One such memo compares his 
staff to that of the Irish Independent. “I have no Assistant Editors, the Independent has 
two; I have two leader writers, the Independent has five; I have 10 subs, the 
Independent has 12; I have a part-time Finance Editor, the Independent has a full-time 
one.” (NLI: 18361).
Indeed, a row with the board was the reason behind his first letter of resignation on 
September 3, 1933. The dispute began over the board’s refusal of his request for £5 
expenses for a journalist travelling to London, “an endeavour for which the Irish 
Independent considers it normal to spend £25”. He points out that “the Irish Press is a 
new paper; its editorial (ie, its principal) machine had to be created from nothing. It
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was created by me out of the most mixed elements, trained, partly trained and 
untrained ...” (NLI: 18361). His resignation was not accepted on this occasion, but it 
was one of many battles with the board, and later with the general manager J J 
Harrington (imported from America) over matters of resources. The appointment of 
Harrington did much to poison the atmosphere in the offices of the Irish Press. “Mr 
Harrington has the American view of workers -  they must be shown who is the boss 
and the way to show them is to sack someone important,” Gallagher said in his 
resignation letter, adding that he had seen Harrington shouting at one of the senior 
journalists in front of his subordinates: “he continued to do so until strongly checked 
by me”.
In a letter to de Valera dated July 17, 1933, he objects strongly to Harrington’s plan to 
“remodel the editorial office to counter abuses, such as the smell of drink in the sports 
room ...” (NLI: 18361). In the same letter, he bemoans his lack of resources: “Last 
night we carried no pictures of the Fr Griffin memorial because our art editor was 
afraid to bring his man back by car. The Independent did and beat us.” This war of 
attrition brought another letter of resignation on October 10, 1934, in which he gave 
six months notice. The board accepted his resignation at a meeting on April 29, 1935. 
The resignation is effective from May 1, but Gallagher accepted their request to stay 
on for two further months. He finally left in July 1935.
The role played by de Valera in Gallagher’s resignation should not be underestimated. 
As Controlling Director, de Valera had immense influence over the general direction 
of the paper, as well as its day-to-day content. Gallagher, as letters in his archive 
show, wrote several times to de Valera to seek his support when going in to argue
with the board over various economies they wished to foist on him. This support was 
not forthcoming, and de Valera refused to back his editor over various issues relating 
to the pay of sub-editors, journalists’ expenses and the demotion of a wages clerk 
suspected of union agitation during a strike of workers in 1934. Gallagher’s 
disenchantment with the atmosphere which prevailed in the Irish Press is evident from 
a letter he wrote to de Valera concerning the sacking of the clerk: “I want to get out of 
your mind any suspicion that there is some dark evil in him for which he is to be 
dismissed. That I know is the method of the Irish Press: the half-spoken innuendo, 
which seems to blast more than any charge that can be met and answered.” (NLI: 
18361). According to one commentator, de Valera’s acceptance of Gallagher’s 
resignation marked a turning point for the paper, and signalled a watershed between 
the old, campaigning paper of the early 1930s and a “more popular, less overtly 
political paper, one that was designed to appeal to the middle classes which were 
being increasingly attracted by Fianna Fail.” (Curran 1994: 316).
The reaction from his staff bears testament to the high regard in which he was held. 
Letter after letter pays tribute to his achievements as editor, and laments his treatment 
at the hands of the board and of Mr Harrington. His secretary Kathleen O’Connell 
wrote that she was “too upset to say much”, while sports editor Joe Sherwood says: 
“Boss, it can’t be true. I know it’s not true. You are coming back.” (NLI: 18361). But 
he wasn’t. He did contribute a long-running weekly column on literature, entitled 
“Books from my Shelf’, but that was the extent of his contact with the paper he had 
done so much to create. He was typically meticulous to the end, writing a memo to de 
Valera explaining why his deputy William Sweetman should succeed him. As the 
weeks passed, the air of despondency did not lift at Burgh Quay, as a letter from M J
McManus in August 1935 shows: McManus found himself in the first week 
“endeavouring to write leaders on subjects I had never thought about” in a place of 
“doom, suspicion and intrigue”. (NLI: 18341).
Perhaps the last word on Gallagher should go to Senator Joseph Connolly, who was a 
member of the board of the Irish Press from the beginning. “Under Frank Gallagher’s 
editorship the paper established itself as a trustworthy and reliable journal, bright 
without being cheap, cultured without being ponderous and above all Irish through 
and through in the things that mattered. It was to me a tragedy not only for the paper 
but for the country when Gallagher ceased to be editor. From that time the tone of the 
paper gradually deteriorated. A new and undesirable streak crept into its columns and 
has continued to grow until the present time...one looks back with nostalgia when 
Frank Gallagher, M J McManus and Aodh de Blacam gave the people the right lead 
and direction on all that really mattered in Catholic Ireland...Gallagher’s leading 
articles dealt with every aspect of the national situation and were, I think, the best 
contributions to national journalism since Arthur Griffith had written in the earlier 
years.” (Connolly 1958: 281-4).
4.7 The post-Gallagher Irish Press
From 1935 onwards, there is a marked change in the paper. The fact that editor Frank 
Gallagher resigned in that year is also significant, as his departure can be seen to 
symbolise a breaking with the first, campaigning, radical days of the paper and the 
ushering in of a new, more conservative approach. Old stalwart columns like An
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Feirmeoir Beag were dropped by the new editor Bill Sweetman.3 The design of the 
paper was overhauled, with more typefaces, shorter stories and greater use of 
photographs. The content too was softer, focusing on Fianna Fáil’s welfare plans and 
shying away from calls for more radical reform. There was a greater concentration on 
human-interest stories in the paper, and less focus on arguments and issues. There was 
more news from Hollywood, and the mood of the paper was more urban than before. 
Catherine Curran's analysis (Curran 1994:280) that Gallagher’s departure marked the 
end of the “radical phase” of the paper and the beginning of a new conservative, 
commercial phase seems accurate. In terms of content, the paper appears less radical, 
less pioneering. Leading articles supported Fianna Fáil welfare plans, but the paper 
distanced itself from more radical reform. From 1936 onwards, the layout of the paper 
changed too. The stories were shorter, with new typefaces, and more reproduction of 
photographs taken with new flash cameras. “Whereas the old style reporting had 
provided detailed political analysis, the new Irish Press placed greater emphasis on 
description of individuals and events”. (Curran 1994: 280). The “An Feirmeoir Beag” 
column, which had emphasised ruralisation, was dropped. (Ibid).
However, the new-look paper’s support for Fianna Fáil policy was unwavering. It 
supported de Valera’s 1936 campaign to have the King of England removed from the 
Constitution, it supported his 1937 Constitution, welcomed his election as Taoiseach 
in coalition with Labour and backed his moves to have the Treaty ports returned. It 
criticised the union of the opposition parties under the banner of the United Ireland
3 As O ’Brien (2001, P67) points out, “the paper went through several editors in the mid-1930s” .
Among them were John O ’Sullivan, who worked as a sub-editor under Gallagher, and John Herlihy, 
who was involved in the Hannah Sheehy-Skeffmgton case in 1937. The board eventually saw the 
wisdom o f Gallagher’s original recommendation for his successor and appointed Bill Sweetman as 
editor in May 1938.
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Party, or Fine Gael: “The Opposition have sunk their differences in order to differ 
more energetically with the Irish nation ... the name for the organisation is United 
Ireland. There is one great recommendation for this name -  it bears not the slightest 
resemblance to Cumann na nGaedheal, Centre Party or National Guard. It is a perfect 
disguise.” (IP: September 10, 1933). It was not entirely slavish in following the party 
line, however. When the authorities stopped a group of Republicans from marching to 
Bodenstown in the summer of 1936, the Press carried a report of Hannah Sheehy- 
Skeffington’s remarks to the crowd before they were moved on. Sheehy-Skeffington, 
who was the first drama critic of the Irish Press, said: “I am glad for one thing: that is 
that the mask is off the Fianna Fail government who can never more raise their heads 
and call themselves Republicans.”
The same Sheehy-Skeffington was at the centre of an embarrassing row involving de 
Valera and the Irish Press in relation to de Valera’s new constitution. The document 
represented “a curious blend of Catholic and nationalism ideologies”. (O’Brien, 2000, 
P84). Article 44 recognised the “special position” of the Catholic Church, Articles 2 
and 3 claimed jurisdiction over the north, and Article 41 recognised the woman’s “life 
w ith in  the home” and stated that women should not “be obliged by economic 
necessity to engage in labour to the neglect of their duties in the home”. According to 
O’Brien (2000, P85), Hannah Sheehy-Skeffington wrote to the chapel (branch) of the 
National Union of Journalists at the paper to say she would have to resign her 
membership as the paper had decided not to accept further material from her because 
of her agitation concerning the clauses in de Valera’s Constitution affecting the status 
of women. The chapel decided to investigate the claim, and said that, if substantiated, 
it would write to the editor and to de Valera himself. “Knowing how important the
Irish Press would be in securing a positive vote for the Constitution, both de Valera 
and the paper’s then editor John Herlihy backed down”. Indeed, the support of the 
paper for the constitution soon became evident in its editorials on the matter. When 
the Women Graduates Association took issue with the kitchen sink role allotted to 
them in the document, the Press devoted considerable space to refuting their 
argument. The leader writers poured scorn on “the learned ladies whose zeal in the 
national cause has in many cases been conspicuous by its absence.” (IP: June 26, 
1937).
As Catherine Curran’s analysis points out, the paper’s tack changed from one of 
attack when Fianna Fail were in opposition to one of defence once they were in 
power. For instance, in 1937 when the Irish Independent published a feature saying 
poverty and hunger were widespread in the country, the Irish Press responded by 
showing what government schemes were available. And when the Independent 
reported that west Cork was particularly badly hit by poverty, the Press reported “The 
People Of Adrigoole Have Confidence In The Government”. (IP: April 5, 1937).
As the party became more conservative and more anxious to gain the support of the 
middle classes, so too did the paper. Indeed, the paper showed considerable dexterity 
in appearing to maintain some consistency of conviction as it followed Fianna Fail 
policy through a series of notable about-faces. The leader writers of the Press 
managed to support the 1938 trade pact with Britain, having vigorously pursued a no­
surrender policy during the Economic War; they supported the new Fianna Fail 
campaign for efficiency and new investment in industry, having previously castigated
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industry as the great evil of modem times and promoted small-scale rural crafts as the 
way forward.
Another about-turn performed by the leader writers of the Irish Press concerned the 
paper’s attitude towards the Spanish Civil War. When Fianna Fail was in opposition, 
the paper expressed sympathy for the Republican side. (Indeed, reporter Paddy Clare 
was given leave to fight for the International Brigade.) But when the war broke out in 
1936, de Valera was in power, and the paper supported his policy of neutrality. This 
meant that the Irish Press to all intents and purposes ignored the conflict in Spain, 
providing its main rival with an opportunity to increase its circulation at the expense 
of the Irish Press. The Irish Independent supported Franco and carried a daily half­
page report entitled “In War-Torn Spain”. As one author has noted, “ ... in the Spanish 
War, the Irish Press did not particularly favour either side; the Irish Independent’s 
policy was pro-Franco and the means by which this policy was expressed was 
sensational. From the beginning of that war, the Independent’s sales, previously 
falling, climbed and its competitor paid the price of impartiality with a flattening out 
of its rapidly rising circulation graph.” (The Bell. Feb 1945, P394).
The Irish Press again rallied to the Fianna Fail flag for the General Election of 1938, 
calling for a large turn-out as “not only good democracy and good nationalism and 
therefore good for the only national party” and pointing out that Fine Gael “did not 
possess even the shreds of an intelligible national policy”. (IP, June 8, 1938). Fianna 
Fail won an overall majority of 16 seats. As the Second World War loomed, the Irish 
Press seemed to become more than ever an arm of government. Whereas in its early, 
populist days, the paper had encouraged people to unite against the status quo, in
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September 1939 and throughout the war, it showed a tendency to lecture its readers 
about their duty. Typical was the paper’s editorial on September 4, 1939, the very eve 
of war: “ .. .our responsibilities as citizens is to see that by no word or act of ours 
shall.. .lead us beyond what the State has proclaimed our national purpose to be.” As 
O’Brien (2000, P90) has noted: “the paper began to speak down to the people.”
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4.8 A parting of the wavs: the Fianna Fail sub-committec on publicity
Despite what seems to the modem reader like slavish adherence by the Irish Press to 
the Fianna Fail party line, certain sections of Fianna Fail were not happy with the 
policy of the paper. The party’s sub-committee on publicity, dominated in its early 
days by Senator Colonel Maurice Moore and Frank Aiken, then Minister for Defence, 
had frequent cause to bemoan the party’s treatment at the hands of the paper. One 
indignant committee minute complains: “Considerable difficulty has been 
experienced in securing publication of matter in this journal and it is affording very 
little co-operation in the work. Steps must be taken to ensure more satisfactory results 
in the future ... It was decided to refer the question of the relations between this 
committee and the Irish Press to the National Executive.” (Fianna Fail: FF380, 
September 18, 1933).
Despite frequent public disavowals of a direct, official relationship between Fianna 
Fail and the Irish Press (as one writer noted: “Members of the government have
denied any official connection; which is quite accurate without being wholly true.
IThe Bell, March 1945, P475]), the party’s publicity sub-committee continued to 
regard the paper as being entirely at its disposal. Members obviously felt they had a 
great influence on the day-to-day running of the paper. There are records of them 
deciding that May 22, 1937, should be the date that the Press publish its “10 Years of 
Fianna Fail” supplement, (Fianna Fail: FF 380, April 5, 1937) and agreeing that the 
paper should go ahead with a supplement marking de Valera’s visit to the US. (Fianna 
Fail: FF 380, February 20, 1939).
The sub-committee did not have any qualms about making its views known about 
what it saw as the general deterioration of standards at the Irish Press towards the end 
of 1939:
“The series o f  articles on Germany appearing in the Irish Press by arrangement with the London Daily 
Telegraph was considered harmful to the National interest and to the interests o f  the paper, and it was 
agreed to ask the Executive [Council] to make representations to the Editor with a view to their 
discontinuance.
“Arising out o f  this discussion, it was felt by the Committee that the whole tone o f  the news 
presentation in the Irish Press left much to be desired from the point o f view or our neutrality in the 
European War. The Committee was o f opinion that steps should be taken to remedy this position.
(Fianna Fail: FF380, December 12, 1939).
Indeed, the Fianna Fail government did not see any incongruity in suggesting to the 
German embassy, which had complained of the articles, that they supply a series of 
articles of their own, which could also be published in the Irish Press. (O’Brien, 2000, 
P94). The dissatisfaction of the party with the paper carried on into the 1940s, as can
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be seen from a subsequent publicity sub-committee minute: “Arising out of a letter 
from Deputy M J Kennedy regarding the suggested adoption of Cumainn of a pledge 
to buy only the Irish Press, the Committee, while in favour of the principle, felt that 
there should be a quid pro quo on the part of the Irish Press before action on the lines 
described could be recommended to the organisation.” (Fianna Fail: FF380, January 
15, 1940).
The committee became even more heated by the Press’s coverage of the campaign to 
gain a reprieve for Irish Republicans sentenced to jail in Birmingham: “On January 
31st the Press devoted a 3 col heading and 53 inches to the list of British Army dead in 
France, but could not find space until next day for the appeal for a reprieve which got 
only two inches on a dead page. The Secretary wrote to the Irish Press in protest, 
enclosing a stamped addressed envelope for a reply, but even this was ignored. The 
Committee decided to draw the attention of the Executive [Council] to this continued 
ignoring of representation by the paper with a view to having the whole matter 
considered by the Taoiseach.” (Fianna Fail: FF 380, February 5, 1940). The “whole 
matter” came to a head when the editor of the Irish Press was “invited” to appear 
before the sub-committee to discuss party grievances with the paper. The Secretary’s 
report of the meeting, which took place on March 28, 1940, and lasted for two hours, 
is interesting:
“The main points o f discussion included:
(1) Necessity for closer contact between local organisation and ‘Irish Press’ correspondents;
(2) Publication o f a weekly feature o f  Cumainn reports, giving more space to members’ views;
(3) Possibility o f occasional write-up of organisation’s doings in important centres such as
Cork, Limerick, etc;
(4) More reference to Government’s achievements in constituencies where by-elections are
pending;
(5) Publication o f Cumainn resolutions thanking Ministers o f  Deputies for work done;
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(6) Arrangement for adequate coverage o f  important Constituency or County Conventions;
(7) Complaints o f insufficient space given to speeches by Fianna Fail member o f  the 
Oireachtas or public bodies;
(8) Importance o f more Editorial comment on Fine Gael statements and British war aims (in 
relation to Partition);
(9) Possibility o f series o f  articles on self-sufficiency policy; prices compared with other 
neutral countries etc;
(10) Complaints o f bias in War reports and insufficient use o f Radio to check usual news 
services;
(11) Suggested broadening o f the correspondence column;
(12) Ways and means o f helping to increase circulation and advertising.
“M r Sweetman, while denying that there was any ground for complaint in certain o f  the 
matters raised, promised to give consideration to suggested improvements . . .”
(Fianna Fail: FF380).
Another insight into the character of Sweetman and his attitude to the Irish Press’s 
role as mouthpiece for Fianna Fail comes from a recollection by a former colleague of 
Sweetman’s, Douglas Gageby: “Sweetman had great nerve. There were three things 
you were told when you joined the Irish Press: one was the Eamon de Valera had only 
one ‘n ’; the second was the there was no such place as Navan, it was An Uaimh; the 
third was that Kells was to be referred to as Ceannanais Mor. Dev would ring up and 
ask for Sweetman. ‘Mr Sweetman, that speech of mine today... ’ ‘Yes, sir, we have it 
here’ ‘Did I end by saying such and such?’ ‘Yes, you did.’ ‘Very good.’ One day, the 
call came through. ‘Mr Sweetman, you know that speech I am giving in Navan 
tonight... ? “Just a moment sir while I have a look at the news list. No we have no 
record of it.’ ‘I’m making a very important speech in Navan tonight... ’ ‘Oh, here it 
is .. .An Uaimh’.” (Interview with the author).
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The party’s dissatisfaction with the paper extended to even higher levels of the Fianna 
Fail hierarchy. A minute from a May 1939 National Executive meeting conjures up an 
image of an intense, committed clippings clerk saving all the brickbats hurled at the 
party from Abbey Street: “It was agreed to refer to the Irish Press for publication a 
folder entitled ‘The Irish Independent and Neutrality’.” (Fianna Fail: FF 342, May 1, 
1939). Later during the war, they did not hesitate to mobilise the Irish Press in 
defence of the Government: “The Irish Press should be approached ... with a view to 
the publication of a special supplement which would allow the progress made in 
social, economic and political fields under the present Government to be shown. It 
was also decided that Mr Little should interview the editor-in-chief of the Irish Press 
regarding summaries of reports of public institutions published in that journal which 
were regarded as being unnecessarily critical of Government policy.” (Fianna Fail: 
FF342, April 28, 1941).
The fact that the party was moving away from a situation where the Press was its only 
mouthpiece is noticeable in the minutes of Fianna Fail Publicity Sub-Committee.
From the early 1930s, it is primarily concerned with how the new Fianna Fail 
government is perceived by the press in general. A typical minute from these days 
reads: “During the week ending December 18th, hostile criticism was refuted in, and 
material supplied to 15 home and 6 foreign papers”. (Fianna Fail: FF380, December 
18, 1933). At the beginning of the 1940s, members continue to exercise themselves 
over the treatment of party policy and party leaders at the hands of the press, and 
especially the Irish Press: “ .. .it was noted that the Irish Press made a poor defence of 
the Budget” (May 11, 1941)“...The unfavourable treatment by the Irish Press as 
contrasted with the Irish Times of the news of the Government supplying coal to meet
a shortage in the railways was noted” (October 13, 1941) “ .. .the Irish Press was 
discussed and from the position of the Fianna Fail organisation it was considered very 
unsatisfactory” (July 13, 1942) . .It was agreed that the attitude of the Irish Press
towards the general election publicity was unsatisfactory” (January 30, 1943). But as 
the decade progressed, the time of the committee is more taken up with radio 
coverage, lectures and broadcasts, and discussion of the Irish Press all but disappears.
4.8 Conclusion
The war years were a time of retrenchment for the paper. Douglas Gageby, who 
joined the paper in 1945, recalls that “ The Press had saved money during the war.
The papers were very small -  four pages or so -  and there was very little money 
spent.” (Interview with the author, October 10, 1997). Wartime was also a time of 
rare co-operation between the rival newspapers: “Old animosities were temporarily 
forgotten as the three national newspaper companies pooled together to buy two 
lorries to distribute their papers.” (O’Brien, 2000, P94).
In early 1943, de Valera introduced legislation extending the life of the Dail, pleading 
that the Emergency made the extension necessary. Due to widespread opposition, he 
was forced to withdraw it. In the period before the 1943 General Election, the Irish 
Press again rallied to the Fianna Fail flag, dismissing calls for a national government, 
and announcing that it was “not only folly but madness to suggest at this moment of 
peril, the people should hand over the government to a bunch of squabbling groups”. 
(IP, June 21, 1943). The election resulted in a Fianna Fail-led minority government, at 
which the Irish Press express disappointment, for Fianna Fail has been entrusted with
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“the onus on forming a government without having received the overall strength 
required to carry out that grave responsibility”. (IP, June 26, 1943). The Irish Press 
also extolled the virtues of de Valera’s famous radio broadcast in which he replied to 
remarks by Winston Churchill which criticised Ireland’s neutral stance during the 
war. The streets were deserted at 10.0 that night, reported the paper, as de Valera 
delivered his reply from the studios of Radio Eireann. “It is a reply for which Irish 
people all over the world will thank the Taoiseach for having made, for it sets out in 
an unanswerable form the reasons which determined this nation’s policy throughout 
these past five years,” said the Press editorial. (IP: May 17, 1945). (Indeed, the Press 
published the speech in pamphlet form some time later.)
The lifting of newspaper censorship at the end of the war involved the Irish Press in 
another controversy in which the paper again supported the government position.
Both the Irish Independent and the Irish Times complained that they had been unfairly 
treated by the censor, whose office, according to the Independent, “operated in a 
stupid, clumsy and unjust manner ... frequently inspired not by national unity but by 
party political motives”. (II, May 12, 1945). The Irish Press, however, defended the 
censor, feeling it “incumbent to pay tribute to the sense and impartiality which 
characterised the very difficult work the censors were called upon to do”. (IP, May 
12, 1945).
Soon after, the Press was again offering uncritical support to de Valera and Fianna 
Fail for the election set for February 4, 1948: “To vote Fianna Fail is the duty of all 
who would not hand us over to the frustration that afflicts so many European nations, 
nations which have long envied Ireland the blessing of a region securely founded in a
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government certain of a parliamentary majority.” (IP: January 2, 1948).
In the run-up to the 1948 general election, the stance of the Irish Press had come 
almost full circle since the contest of 1932. Just as they had ridiculed Cumann na 
nGaedheal’s arguments in favour of stability and continuity in 1932, now they 
supported them when they were put forward by Fianna Fail. Just as they had bristled 
when the establishment had tried to link Fianna Fail with Communism in 1932, so 
now they gave prominent coverage to Ministers who tried to similarly smear the 
radical new party Clann na Poblachta (founded in 1946). Indeed, the Press’s attitude 
to Sean MacBride’s party is interesting, as the party’s policies were very close to 
those of early Fianna Fail, stressing self-sufficiency, economic independence from 
Britain and the return to a rural society. The Press dismissed the policies of the new 
party; editorials poured scorn on their proposals and warned about the threat to 
Christian democracy from the international threat of communism. For instance the 
Press derided as slave labour Clann na Poblachta’s policy of afforestation, 
conveniently forgetting that they bore a striking similarity to de Valera’s proposal for 
labour camps during the Emergency. The attacks on Clann na Poblachta were 
invested with an extra spice with the departure of Aodh de Blacam, author of the 
immensely popular Roddy the Rover column, to the MacBride camp. His attacks on 
Fianna Fail, accusing them of complacency and of abandoning the old policies of 
protectionism and self-sufficiency, put the Irish Press on the defensive. There was a 
new, didactic tone to the Press editorials, as if “the position of voice of the 
government had created a tendency to ‘talk down’ to and lecture its readership.” 
(Curran 1994: 320). The Press’s coverage of de Valera’s campaigning showed how 
complacent the paper had become. The accounts of the Fianna Fail leader’s progress
through the western counties reads like an account of a state visit, with descriptions of 
the great man moving among the people. It sums up the change that had taken place in 
the Press: description had taken over from analysis and argument
In the event, Fianna Fail (68 seats) were forced into the opposition benches when Fine 
Gael (31 seats), Labour and National Labour (19 seats), Clann na Talmhan (7 seats) 
and Clann na Poblachta (10 seats) formed what would today be called a Rainbow 
Coalition. It was the end of 16 years in power, many of which had been spent 
presiding over cutbacks, shortages and rationing of various kinds. “Fianna Fail looked 





It was in the period 1926-1948 that four key elements of the Irish Press were put in 
place. The corporate structure of the company was established by the Articles of 
Association in 1926, and then underwent a significant change with the incorporation 
of the Irish Press American Corporation in 1930. This structure established the all- 
powerful role of the Controlling Director and ensured the dynastic nature of the de 
Valera family’s control of the company. It was during these years too that the 
company’s identification with Fianna Fail was established and that the company’s 
fundraising efforts took place. This was also the period in which the industrial 
relations tone was set for the company. These four factors came, in my view to be 
defining characteristics of the Irish Press during the period under review. It might be a 
fruitful exercise for a scholar of the 1990s to examine the extent to which these four 
factors contributed to the eventual collapse of the Irish Press group in 1995.
5.2 The relationship with Fianna Fail
The role played by the Irish Press in legitimising Fianna Fail was a crucial one. 
Electoral support for Fianna Fail was growing in the years before the paper began 
publishing, but it is by no mean certain that, without the platform provided by the
Irish Press, that de Valera’s party would have secured a sufficiently large percentage 
of the vote to form a government, either on its own or with the support of independent 
deputies. It is certain, however, that with the support of the Irish Press, Fianna Fail 
was able to form a government after the general election of 1932. In six months, from 
September 1931 to January 1932, the paper had changed the perception of Fianna Fail 
from a party of dangerous radicals to a serious political party capable of government.
The paper and the party had the same political origins in the cultural nationalist vision 
of Eamon de Valera. It was a vision of an Irish Ireland which was not articulated by 
any of the national newspapers available in Ireland at the time of the Irish Press’s 
birth.
The Irish Press succeeded in demonising Cumann na nGaedheal and its supporters as 
“unpatriotic, urban-based imperialists” (O’Brien 2000, P307) while at the same time 
giving voice to de Valera’s vision of a Catholic, nationalist, rural community. It 
attacked with gusto what it saw as the Cumann na nGaedheal government’s 
subservience to Britain and supported anti-Empire movements all over the world. At 
every opportunity, it put forward de Valera’s agenda for an independent, agrarian, 
anti-corporate, self-sufficient society and contrasted that agenda favourably with the 
conservative, laissez-faire policies of Cumann na nGaedheal. The primary role of the 
Irish Press in that crucial first year of its existence was to propound Fianna Fail 
policy, to show it as a viable alternative to the Cumann na nGaedheal Free State 
administration, and to reassure its readers that Fianna Fail were capable of taking 
charge of the country and managing its economy and its relationship with Britain. 
Essentially, the Irish Press was a persuader for Fianna Fail.
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Once Fianna Fail assumed power in 1932, the role of the Irish Press changed. In the 
years that Fianna Fail were in power, the Irish Press was not merely charged with 
persuading its readers about the merits of Fianna Fail policy, but also with defending 
the party in times of crisis. Throughout the controversies over the removal of the 
Oath, the McNeill Affair, the withholding of land annuities and the Economic War, 
the paper defended the government’s stance from attack from the British government, 
from international public opinion and from opposition parties. The paper’s tone 
changed from that of a campaigning, radical, anti-Establishment journal to that of a 
conservative newspaper interested in preserving the status quo and opposed to radical 
change. This change of tone is most evident in (i) its treatment of Clann na Poblachta, 
which was beginning to threaten Fianna Fail position as the voice of nationalism, and 
(ii) its tone in lecturing or talking down to its readership during the Emergency. 
Where once it had stood shoulder to shoulder with them, now it told them what their 
duty was. It had become a defender of Fianna Fail.
During several controversies involving the Irish Press during these years, such as the 
McNeill Affair and the row over the repayment of the Republican Loan, de Valera 
stated that he had no say in the day-to-day running of the Irish Press. This is at odds 
with the evidence, which shows that he had no compunction in changing the way in 
which the paper reported the news. In the McNeill Affair, the Irish Press was used as 
a propaganda tool in a very direct way, and the minutes of the party’s Publicity Sub- 
Committee show that Fianna Fail had a proprietary attitude towards the paper, 
presuming to decide when it would carry commemorative supplements and offering
the German Ambassador access to its columns to refute a series of articles on 
Germany taken from the London Daily Telegraph.
From its very conception in 1919, when de Valera first became convinced of the need 
for a national newspaper to put across his views, to its birth in 1931, and throughout 
16 years of unbroken Fianna Fail government from 1932 to 1948, the links between 
the Irish Press and the Fianna Fail party were close. However, towards the end of the 
period under review, the beginnings of a split in the hegemony of Fianna Fail were 
taking place. The catalyst for the disagreement was a plan to introduce a system of 
children’s allowances in 1944. The debate on this initiative centred on Sean Lemass 
and his innovative Department of Industry and Commerce and Sean McEntee and his 
conservative Department of Finance. This divergence of views among the senior 
ranks of the party “would be greatly amplified in the free trade debates of the 1950s.” 
(O’Brien, 2000, P96). The Irish Press supported Machete’s view, but the first cracks 
in the monolith of de Valera’s cultural nationalism had appeared.
The dilemma over which section of Fianna Fail to support became a familiar one for 
the Irish Press. As the party fragmented over various issues in the period 1948-1995 
the paper was left plaintively calling for unity. This lack of engagement with the 
process of change contrasts sharply with the radical, populist early days of the 
newspaper. The predictable nature of its support for Fianna Fail, or, in the absence of 
a unified Fianna Fail policy, its calls for party unity, together with the many rhetorical 
u-tums the paper was forced to make in the transition from a persuader for Fianna Fail 
to a defender of the party, damaged the credibility of the paper. “In a sense, the paper 
has never fully escaped the legacy of populism, the contradiction between tradition
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and modernity, which has been the hallmark of politics in Ireland.” (Curran, 1994, 
P368). Although the Irish Press supported Lemass in the debate over the opening up 
of the Irish economy in 1957, it was somehow caught with one leg in the past. The 
fact that it was in the control of the de Valera family from 1926 to 1995 meant it 
could never ultimately decouple itself from de Valera’s cultural nationalism of the 
1930s, whereas the Fianna Fail party managed to change and develop from the late 
1950s onwards, as de Valera’s influence began to wane.
Jim McGuinness, who became editor in 1954, describes the dilemma of the Irish Press 
of (i) not being as useful to Fianna Fail in a more sophisticated, modem Ireland, and 
(ii) not being free enough of Fianna Fail to reach out to a more general, less politically 
affiliated audience, well:
“These clear delineations were beginning to become blurred.. .1 felt that this welcome lack, if  
you like, o f  extreme partisanship.. .made the job  o f  the Press coming out as an honourable, 
constructive supporter o f  one party was deficient in two ways. It didn’t  make it as formidable 
a tool in the hands o f the Fianna Fail party as it would have been and it didn’t enable it to 
reach out to people as a newspaper in the way that it could do if  it took a more objective 
view.”
(Interview with the author, August 7, 1997)
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The paper’s close ties with Fianna Fail, and with the de Valera brand of cultural 
nationalism in particular, were forged in the period 1919-1948, but they continued to 
influence the paper until its closure. Throughout many of the modern-day crises to 
have affected Fianna Fail, such the Arms Crisis, the Haughey-Colley and the 
Haughey-O’Malley divisions, the paper felt, in the words of its last editor Hugh 
Lambert, “hobbled by the past,” unsure “which Fianna Fail to support”. (O’Brien, 
2000,312)
5.3 Corporate structure
The conjunction of two separate threads regarding the corporate structure of the Irish 
Press contrived to insulate the board of the company from any outside interference 
and from the influence of market forces. The first of these was the creation, in the 
company’s Articles of Association, of the role of Controlling Director. This figure 
was endowed with absolute power over the commercial and editorial policies of the 
company. The Controlling Director was also endowed with the power to choose his 
own successor. The second was the way in which Eamon de Valera went about 
persuading the investors in the original Republican Bond to transfer their investment 
to the Irish Press. The ownership of this money was transferred, not to the Irish Press 
company, but to de Valera personally as Controlling Director. Furthermore, the legal 
documents which the original subscribers were entreated to sign entrusted the money 
to de Valera and his successors in perpetuity. Thus the coming together of these two 
circumstances, whether by design or not, contrived to secure control of the Irish Press 
company for de Valera and any he chose to succeed him.
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The way in which the Irish Press was constituted, with sole executive power 
concentrated in the person of the controlling director, may have been suited to the 
early mission of the paper to put forward the Republican point of view to the public. It 
is easy to under stand de Valera’s early fear that the Irish Press might easily be blown 
off the course he had plotted for it when he first dreamed of the paper in the early 
1920s. But by the time he handed control over to his son in 1959, the mission of the 
Irish Press was largely accomplished. During the period under review here, Fianna 
Fail had been in power for 16 years. For that time, the Irish Press had put across the 
Fianna Fail point of view. There was no longer a culture of ignoring, or denigrating 
the utterances of Republican leaders in the Irish national press. So the controls set in 
place in the early, pioneering days of the early 1930s were no longer necessary in the 
late 1940s. Indeed, it is possible to argue that such a rigid structure and tight control 
prevented the market from influencing the management of the Irish Press in any way 
whatsoever.
Furthermore, the fact that subscribers on both sides of the Atlantic were mostly people 
of modest means meant that there were no institutional investors who might have 
applied greater pressure for transparency or change. An examination of the early 
returns for the Irish Press at the Irish Companies Registration Office shows that 
subscriptions came in small amounts. According to the companies regulations, share 
allotments of more than £8 in value had to be registered with the Companies Office, 
so along with each annual return is a list of the smattering of shareholders who had 
paid up since the last return. These lists provide an insight into the type of investor the 
Irish Press attracted: NT (national teacher), labourer, maidservant and farmer are the
most common occupations, with “gentleman” and “married woman” less frequent. 
The preponderance of trades like bootmaker, cooper and blacksmith also strike the 
modem reader. The amount invested was almost universally the minimum £1. Some 
clerics managed £10, while an investment of £100 or more stands out among the 
pages and pages of smaller “speculators”. One commentator points out: 
“Paradoxically, the predominance of small shareholders made it easier to gain control 
of the paper than would have been the case had it been financed in the main by 
commercial interests.” (Curran 1996: 8).
Other writers and analysts have been keen to show that de Valera and his family acted 
for personal gain. In the accounts in Coogan, and indeed in the Dail attack by Browne, 
there is the inference that de Valera was benefiting financially from his role in the 
Irish Press. This writer does not believe that to be the case. There is no evidence of a 
great personal fortune being amassed by the de Valera family. It appears that de 
Valera, having created his “great enterprise”, could not let go. To this writer, it 
appears de Valera believed himself to be acting from the highest motives and was 
genuinely wounded by the attacks on him. Such was his idealistic fervour when it 
came to the Irish Press that he thought little about appearances. He was so sure of his 
own morality that he believed his personal charisma alone would banish any base 
imputations of wrong-doing. In considering the fate of the Irish Press, it ultimately 
matters little whether de Valera had 500 shares or 5,000 shares. It matters only that de 
Valera first conceived, then funded and lastly ran the paper like a personal fiefdom, 
and that the way he structured the company allowed him and his descendants to do so 
for over 60 years. It seems likely to this writer that (i) de Valera’s creation of the role 
of Controlling Director was motivated by a concern to protect the nationalist ethos of
the paper, and (ii) that the legal copper-fastening of the transfer of funds from the 
Republican Loan investors was undertaken from the same motives.
However, the fact that the company was thus arranged, with an omnipotent 
Controlling Director at its head, and the fact that the Controlling Director was entitled 
to choose his successor, turned the Irish Press company into a de Valera dynasty. The 
dynastic nature of the company, together with its rigid hierarchy, made it particularly 
unsuited to adapting to change. “Of all the national titles, the Irish Times was the first 
to recognise the need for change. While the Independent followed suit in the 1970s, 
the Press titles waited until the recession-ridden 1980s to modernise their titles -  a 
delay that would ultimately prove fatal.” (O’Brien, 2001, P234). Taken together with 
its institutional nostalgia for the cultural nationalism of the 1930s, this rigid corporate 
structure was a recipe for commercial stasis.
5.4 Industrial relations
There was a builders’ strike just as the premises of the Irish Press was nearing 
completion in 1930; the newspaper group’s demise came in a flurry of industrial 
action, including several strikes, works-to-rule and a lock-out. Nor were the periods in 
between notable for their industrial calm. The years 1933 to 1935 were punctuated 
with sackings, resignations and claims of wrongful dismissal. The troubled industrial 
relations which contributed to the eventual downfall of the company had their origins 
in this period, and the tone was set by the treatment of founding editor Frank 
Gallagher. Gallagher had brought the paper great success in terms of circulation, but 
advertising revenue was slower to come in. The general lack of resources meant that
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Gallagher was forced to produce the Irish Press with 20% fewer staff than his main 
rival, the Irish Independent. Wages at the fledgling Irish Press were also lower that at 
the Independent. In this period, Gallagher had frequent clashes with the board, 
including one over his sanctioning of £5 expenses for a journalist relocating to 
London. The Independent rate for the same circumstance was £25, but the board saw 
fit to accuse Gallagher of extravagance. This accusation led to one of many 
resignation offers from Gallagher.
The appointment of an “efficiency expert”, John J Harrington, from the United States, 
and the constant fretting over finances of Vivion de Valera, who joined the company 
in 1933, put Gallagher under immense pressure regarding the management of his 
editorial budget. The interference of Harrington and Vivion de Valera eventually 
proved too much for Gallagher, and he left in 1935. The pretext for his resignation 
was the systematic victimisation by Harrington of a wages clerk who had a minor 
involvement in yet another Irish Press strike, but the origins of his unease with his 
treatment by the board went back further. “Gallagher was revered by his staff and he 
trained most of them, so pressure on him from Harrington and the board, together 
with his resignation, caused an upheaval that contributed to the long-standing division 
between management and editorial staff that lasted into the 1980s.” (Cahill, 1997, 
P286).
The high-handed approach of Harrington, the reluctance of Eamon de Valera to 
intervene in the many disputes involving Gallagher and the board, the confrontational 
nature of disputes between unions and management in the period 1931 to 1948 all 
contributed to the creation of an “us and them” split between the commercial and
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editorial sides of the company. As one commentator remarks of later disputes: 
“Negotiations with the Press Group were always confrontational; a result perhaps of 
the abysmal industrial relations culture that had afflicted the company from day one.” 
(O’Brien, 2000, P303).
5.5Fund-raising
The fund-raising operation for the Irish Press was a failure on both sides of the 
Atlantic. Despite mobilising every resource at his disposal -  from enlisting some of 
Fianna Fail’s top administrators to galvanising the party’s local cumainn -  the amount 
raised was disappointing. The fact that de Valera was trying to raise money at the 
height of the Great Depression contributed to the shortfall between the amount sought 
(£200,000) and the amount raised (£160,000). Even these amounts are misleading, at 
least in respect of the Irish fund-raising operation, as the amount pledged was by no 
means the same as the amount subscribed. The early annual returns of the Irish Press 
company show that the shares allotted exceeded the shares “subscribed”: the money 
from the company’s small subscribers arrived in small amounts over the first years of 
the paper’s existence. A picture emerges in the early to mid-1930s of a business 
under-funded by 20%, some £40,000 short of the “minimum necessary” to establish 
the newspaper. Random checks on the returns of the Irish Press American 
Corporation show that the number of issued shares rose to 61,497 by the mid-1950s. 
The Irish Press company itself increased its nominal share capital to 250,000 in 1935, 
but even by the time of its closure in 1995, subscribed capital amounted to £228,637, 
a figure that had not increased since the mid-1940s. (Irish Companies Registration 
Office).
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It is clear that these four factors which came to define the Irish Press - poor industrial 
relations, under-capitalisation, inflexible corporate structure and out-dated loyalty to 
Fianna Fail -  all came into place during the timeframe covered by this thesis.
Appendix 1
Leading article in the first issue of the Irish Press. September 5, 1931 
“Our Purpose
The Irish Press greets the Irish people.
Our intention is to be the voice of the people, to speak for them, to give utterance to 
their ideals, to defend them against slander and false witness.
Our purpose, also, is to speak to the people, to offer them guidance in times of 
difficulty, to uphold and strengthen them in hours of crises, always to direct them 
towards those things which matter to them most.
Our service will be to the whole people. We are not the organ of an individual, or a 
group, or a party. We are a national organ in all that that term conveys. To us the Irish 
nation is a brotherhood, a separate community whose sub-divisions may have aims 
peculiar to themselves, but all of whom may call this country their own and strive to 
make it great.
Our policy is simple and can be stated simply. In national affairs we stand for 
independence, for that greatest temporal blessing a nation may enjoy, the full liberty 
of its people.
We seek the establishment o f a free Government based on Christian principles and 
founded in social justice.
Our ideal, culturally, is an Irish Ireland, an Ireland aware of its own greatness, sure of 
itself, conscious of the spiritual forces which have formed it into a distinct people 
having its own language and customs and a traditionally Christian philosophy of life. 
The realisation of those ideals calls for one quality more than any other -  an honesty 
that is above question. We have given ourselves the motto: Truth in the News. We
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shall be faithful to it. Even where the news exposes a weakness of our own, or a 
shortcoming in the policies we approve, or a criticism of the individuals with whom 
we are associated, we shall publish it if its inherent news values so demand. In foreign 
news truth may not be so easy to discover, for like all papers the Irish Press must rely 
for accounts of certain foreign happenings on agencies which see international events 
from their own angle. We shall, however, never consciously use this journal to 
mislead our friends or to misrepresent those who oppose us.
Until to-day the Irish people have had no daily paper in which Irish interests were 
made predominant. There has been nothing comparable in Ireland to the great 
English, French, and American dailies, which look naturally out upon the world from 
their own national territory and speak authoritatively for their peoples. Until to-day 
there was no Irish newspaper which could be quoted abroad as expressing the 
distinctive outlook of this nation on international affairs and on the problems of 
industry and economics which beset the world. The absence of such a journal has 
been a grievous loss to this country. The Irish Press makes good that deficiency. 
Henceforth other nations will have a means of knowing that Irish opinion is not 
merely an indistinct echo of a certain section of the British Press.
We cannot give ourselves a higher purpose than to make this paper what those who 
have so long waited for it desire it to be. The ten thousand Irishmen and women, here 
at home and beyond the seas who have made this great enterprise possible, were 
inspired by no hope of gain. Their aim was that Ireland should have a newspaper 
technically efficient in all departments, assured of material success, yet seeking above 
all thing the freedom and well-being of the nation.
(IP: September 5, 1931).
120
Appendix 2
Leading article in the first issue of the Evening Press, June 3, 1932 
“Good evening everybody!
The Evening Press in this, its first issue, tells its readers what it means to do.
It means first of all to be a newspaper [EP emphasis], not forgetting the things of 
interest all over the world, nor failing to report humanity’s doings in every land, but 
giving Irish news its right place.
Hundreds of correspondents, a large staff of reporters, special representatives -  all 
these will gather the happenings of the day for the Evening Press and give them to its 
readers.
Thirdly it means to be a bright paper. Those who read evening papers want to feel 
happy about it. The day’s work is done, the day itself is closing. The Evening Press 
will remember that, and in its make-up, its features and its manner of presenting news 
it will avoid dullness and have life on every page.
Finally, the Evening Press will be a national newspaper. It is founded because the 
Irish people, the ordinary people -  not this class or that class, this party or that party -  
just the ordinary people have come to believe in themselves, have come to realise they 
are the Irish nation. So they are and the Evening Press will represent them.
Its policy will be THE PEOPLE [EP capitals]. In the name of the people it will stand 
for national independence, convinced that until we have that we cannot give to 
civilisation the greatest things in us.
It will stand for Irish things, for Gaelic things first -  for the national language, for
\
national customs, for national pastimes and for a full and rich national outlook.
The Evening Press has no antagonisms. Without concern for who is hurt, it will stand 
for the truth; and also without concern for who is hurt, it will stand against whatever 
tends to injure the status, the culture, the progress of the nation. It may have to oppose 
parties and men. It will do so openly and above board, as strongly as it can, but as 
fairly as it can.
That is our policy and our purpose. Confident that it is the right policy and the right 
purpose, the Evening Press has adopted it. In pursuing it, it will keep one wise rule: to 
be bright in all it does; and one great ideal: to be just to all our people.”
List of abbreviations
AARIR: Association for the Recognition of the Irish Republic 
AP: An Phoblacht
BUP: British United Press (news agency)
B&F: Business and Finance
EP: Evening Press (June -  October, 1932)
FF: Fianna Fail archives 
FOIF: Friends of Irish Freedom 
GSR: Great Southern Railway 
II: Irish Independent 
IP: Irish Press
NLI: National Library of Ireland 
SFL: San Francisco Leader 
ST: Sunday Times 
TCD: Trinity College Dublin 
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